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Abstract
Government regulations are often imperfectly enforced by public officials. In this
study, we investigate if real-time monitoring of policy outcomes can improve enforce-
ment of existing regulations by exploring the introduction of air pollution monitors
in China. Exploiting assignment criteria established by the central government and
new geo-referenced data on local enforcement activities, we show that monitoring: 1)
increases enforcement against local firms, 2) improves the targeting of enforcement,
and 3) reduces aggregate pollution. These effects are driven by officials facing perfor-
mance incentives and are stronger when there is limited scope for data manipulation,
suggesting that real-time monitoring improves top-down accountability.
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1 Introduction
Across the globe, there is a substantial discrepancy between central government regulations
and actual enforcement of those regulations at the local level. This gap exists across a
wide range of policy areas and is particularly severe in low- and middle-income countries
(CIPE, 2012; World Bank, 2017). A common practice to address the principal–agent problem
inherent in the delegation of authority to lower levels of government is to provide high-
powered incentives to implementing officials to ensure that their interests are better aligned
with those of the policymaker.1 However, such incentive schemes require reliable information
on the actions of agents or local policy outcomes. In many settings, such information is either
not widely available, of poor quality, or could easily be manipulated by local officials who
have an interest in misreporting due to the incentives they face (Jacob and Levitt, 2003;
Figlio and Winicki, 2005; Figlio and Getzler, 2006; Banerjee, Duflo, and Glennerster, 2008;
Sandefur and Glassman, 2015; Fisman and Wang, 2017; Greenstone et al., 2019; Acemoglu
et al., 2020).
This paper explores how a technology that enables the central government to directly
monitor local policy outcomes in real time can overcome the gap in enforcement. More
specifically, we study the rollout of air pollution monitors in China – a setting where local
officials face strong incentives to reduce pollution under centrally set targets – and investigate
how that affects local governments’ enforcement of air pollution regulations as well as local
pollution levels. Our focus on environmental policy is motivated by recent reporting from
the United Nation (2019) arguing that a lack of enforcement of environmental regulations is
one of the greatest obstacles that needs to be overcome in order to combat climate change
and pollution. Despite international efforts in recent years to improve air quality, more
than 90% of the world’s population in 2016 (WHO, 2016) still lived in areas where air
pollution exceeded World Health Organization guidelines with far-reaching consequences
for both health and productivity (Neidell and Currie, 2005; Greenstone and Hanna, 2014;
Ebenstein et al., 2017; Jia, 2017; Barwick et al., 2018). A large part of this population lives
in emerging economies, including China, where pollution levels have exceeded the highest
levels ever recorded in rich countries.
We begin by investigating how a central government-led program that introduced 552
pollution monitors in 2015 has shaped the enforcement activities of prefecture-level gov-
1The theoretical literature has focused on how incentives could be designed to ensure the motivation
of agents while decreasing any distortionary impact on effort (Holmström, 1979; Holmström and Milgrom,
1991; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994).
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ernments in China.2 To conduct this analysis, we collect more than 55,000 environmental
enforcement records from local governments. We then classify these records and identify the
firm involved, the type of regulation violated, and the punishment imposed. Using this infor-
mation, we estimate a flexible difference-in-differences model, which compares firms located
close to a monitor with firms located further away from the monitor but within the same
city. The results show an increase in the probability of enforcement by 60% for firms located
within 10 km of a monitor, consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that cities stepped
up enforcement activities close to the monitors after their introduction (see discussion in
Section 4.1 and Figure D9 in the Appendix). The main threat to identification – potential
endogenous placement of monitors – is mitigated in this setting because the placement of
monitors followed strict guidelines issued by the central government. We support this claim
by documenting that the placement of monitors is unrelated to prior enforcement activity
and that there are no differential pre-trends for firms located at different distances from the
monitor. In addition, we show that air pollution monitoring does not affect enforcement of
other environmental regulations related to water or solid waste pollution.
To shed further light on how government actions are affected, we investigate how the
type of enforcement carried out changes in the presence of monitoring. We document that
local governments target and impose stricter punishment against high-polluting firms. City
governments also become more responsive to local pollution levels once monitors have been
introduced. To show this, we exploit exogenous shocks to local pollution induced by fluctu-
ations in rainfall. We show that enforcement is higher when rainfall is low (and pollution
is high) in the presence of monitoring, but that no such relationship exist when there is
no monitoring. This suggests that monitors can ensure a more efficient response by local
enforcement agencies – mitigating concerns that our results are driven by a uniform increase
in enforcement around all monitors.
Building on the above evidence that local enforcement efforts against firms increases in
the vicinity of monitors, we move on to study the pollution monitoring program’s citywide
effects. The focus on the city level allows us to capture the aggregate impact on pollution
(including any within city spillover or displacement effect).3 By exploiting plausibly ex-
ogenous variation in the number of monitors installed in different cities, we can assess the
impact of more extensive monitoring (covering a larger share of the local firm distribution)
2Our sample focuses on the 177 prefecture-level cities that received a monitor for the first time in 2015.
The prefecture-level city is an administrative division ranking below a province and above a county. Figure D8
shows an image of the type of monitors that we study.
3As depicted in Panel B of Figure D1 cities are large geographical units. Due to the administrative
structure in China and the large distance between the urban centres of different cities, we are not concerned
about across city spillovers.
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on total enforcement and pollution outcomes. To capture overall pollution changes at the
city-level, we follow previous literature and use satellite data on the aerosol optical depth
(AOD).4 The AOD data enable us to measure pollution across the whole city both before
and after the introduction of monitors and provide us with a reliable data source that cannot
be manipulated by local officials. To address potential endogenous installation of monitors,
we exploit the strict rules established by the central government, which assign monitors to
cities based on their population and geographical size. Using this information, we employ
three different empirical strategies: a standard difference-in-differences specification for cities
with a different number of monitors, an instrumental variable approach that instruments the
number of monitors by the assigned number, and a regression discontinuity specification that
exploits assignment cutoffs. All three empirical strategies produce consistent estimates and
show that one additional monitor increases enforcement activities by about 20% and reduces
pollution by about 3%. This is a sizable effect given that the median number of monitors
assigned to a city in our sample is 3.
Our preferred interpretation of the above results is that monitors improve the central
government’s ability to hold local officials accountable for their actions. In this setting, local
mayors face promotion incentives (as discussed above, this is a common approach to ad-
dress the principal–agent problem) and are specifically evaluated on their ability to achieve
predefined pollution reduction targets set by the central government. To empirically assess
the validity of this interpretation, we follow Xi, Yao, and Zhang (2018) and exploit dis-
continuities in promotion incentives caused by the age of local mayors at the time of the
National People’s Congress. Estimating our baseline empirical model for mayors facing dif-
ferent promotion probabilities, we find evidence suggesting that monitoring is only effective
when mayors face performance incentives. Hence, this finding is in line with pollution moni-
toring strengthening top-down accountability and through that making existing performance
incentives more effective.
An alternative mechanism explaining our results is that monitors improve bottom-up
accountability.5 This is possible in this setting because the real time air pollution data is
made publicly available on the website of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. To eval-
uate this mechanism, we investigate whether additional monitors strengthen local awareness
of pollution by studying data on city-level online searches for pollution-related keywords.
However, we find limited evidence suggesting that monitoring increases citizens’ awareness
of pollution and therefore conclude that this is unlikely to be an important mechanism in
4We provide validation of the satellite data using ground station measures in subsequent periods.
5Previous empirical studies (Chen, Pan, and Xu, 2016; Meng, Pan, and Yang, 2017) have found that
authoritarian regimes are also responsive to citizen pressure. It is plausible that citizens better informed
about pollution will pressure the local government to act in our setting.
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this setting.
Finally, as discussed above, there are two main reasons why information about policy
outcomes may be lacking or of poor quality in low- and middle-income countries: capacity
constraints and misreporting. The policy we study is potentially reducing both of these
factors at the same time. To shed some light on the relative importance of the two factors, we
take advantage of an additional policy shift – the reassignment of control of the monitors from
the local government to external third parties. This reassignment decouples the information
provision responsibility from the enforcement of regulation responsibility and was conducted
after it was discovered that several local governments tried to manipulate the data from
the monitors. By exploiting information from the monitors as well as our satellite-based
measure of pollution, we show that the monitor recordings are more strongly correlated
with the satellite data when they are under the control of a third party – consistent with a
reduction in manipulation. Following this logic, we further document that when monitors
are under the control of the independent third party, the effect of an additional monitor on
enforcement and pollution is substantially larger. This provides suggestive evidence that not
only the capacity to collect information is important for top-down accountability, but also
the way in which this information is provided.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it relates to a growing empir-
ical literature studying policies aimed at reducing pollution in developing countries. Prior
work has documented that regulatory changes can bring about pollution reduction (Green-
stone and Hanna, 2014; Tanaka, 2015; Ebenstein et al., 2017) and that the incentives faced
by both local leaders (Kahn, Li, and Zhao, 2015) and auditors matter for policy outcomes
(Duflo et al., 2013). However, the literature also emphasizes that enforcement of environ-
mental regulations is a major challenge (see, e.g., discussion in Greenstone and Hanna, 2014)
and that we know little about how to improve it in developing countries (Shimshack, 2014).
For example, simply increasing the rate of environmental inspections does not seem to have
any substantial impact on compliance and environmental outcomes due to the importance
of regulatory discretion (Duflo et al., 2018). Our findings suggest that improved monitor-
ing of local pollution – a policy that strengthens top-down accountability without reducing
regulatory discretion – could be an effective way of addressing the enforcement gap and
reducing pollution. Hence, our work suggests that automatic pollution monitoring could be
an effective policy instrument to address high levels of pollution in developing countries. We
also relate to two concurrent studies that investigate other dimensions of the same pollution
monitoring program (Greenstone et al., 2019; Barwick et al., 2020). Barwick et al. (2020)
investigate the impact of sharing air pollution information with the public and show how
that leads to avoidance behavior, while Greenstone et al. (2019) study how the updating of
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monitors in major cities (as opposed to the rollout of new monitors in smaller cities that we
study) improved air pollution data quality and reduced the scope for manipulating the data.
An additional related concurrent paper is He, Wang, and Zhang (2020), which studies how
water pollution monitoring affect firm performance and document that firms immediately
upstream of a water monitor have lower productivity than those immediately downstream.
Our work complements these studies by showing how air pollution monitoring affect the
enforcement behavior of local governments and aggregate pollution levels.
Second, we contribute to an extensive literature showing that monitoring and the pro-
vision of information can improve accountability and government performance (Besley and
Burgess, 2002; Olken, 2007; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005, 2011;
Kosack and Fung, 2014; Avis, Ferraz, and Finan, 2018). While the broader literature has
considered the impact of media as well as of audits, we are most closely aligned with recent
work showing how information technology affects government performance and efficiency
(Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan, 2012; Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar, 2016; Dhaliwal
and Hanna, 2017; Banerjee et al., 2020). Proponents of such technological innovations have
argued that they could increase efficiency, reduce the scope for manipulation and be im-
plemented at a relatively low cost. Our study differs from previous work by focusing on
monitoring of the final policy outcome (pollution), rather than intermediate inputs in policy
production – such as public official attendance (Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan, 2012; Dhaliwal and
Hanna, 2017) or transfer of funds (Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar, 2016; Banerjee
et al., 2020). While the monitoring of final policy outcomes might not always be feasible, it
could mitigate concerns about multitasking (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) associated with
intermediate monitoring. We show that policy outcome monitoring can indeed be effective
in the context of pollution. In addition, we expand prior work by studying how enforcement
of regulations as opposed to public service provision is affected by monitoring.
Third, we relate to a literature investigating the potentially distorting effect of high-
powered incentives on data reporting (Banerjee, Duflo, and Glennerster, 2008; Fisman and
Wang, 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2020), including manipulating pollution data (Andrews, 2008;
Chen et al., 2013; Ghanem and Zhang, 2014; Oliva, 2015). We contribute to this literature
by studying how control over the information infrastructure (shifting from local governments
to external firms) is correlated with the quality of information as well as government actions
and actual policy outcomes. While we are cautious when interpreting the results from this
analysis due to the strong assumptions required for causal inference, it has the benefit that
we can observe both potentially manipulated data from monitors as well as satellite data
independent of government influence (and therefore also policy impact).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the context as well as the rollout
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of the pollution monitoring program we investigate. After that, the data used in this study is
described (Section 3). The first analysis, which explores firm-level evidence on enforcement,
is presented in Section 4.1. The causal effect of pollution monitoring on enforcement and
actual pollution at the city level is reported in Section 4.2. These two sections present both
the respective empirical strategies and results. The analysis of the mechanisms is discussed
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Institutional Context
This section provides background information and describes the context in which the national
monitoring program studied in this paper was introduced. In the first subsection 2.1, we
describe the environmental policies in place in China during this period and discuss the local
leaders’ role in achieving them. After that, the program rolled out to monitor these policies’
implementation is described in subsection 2.2.
2.1 Environmental Policies in China
While the Chinese government’s priority during the past decades has largely been to stim-
ulate economic growth, attention has lately shifted towards environmental policies (Zheng
and Kahn, 2017).6 Starting in 2013, the National Air Quality Action Plan was set up to
improve air quality by the end of 2017. As a part of China’s successful “war on pollution”
(Greenstone and Schwarz, 2018), the plan laid out the general goal for the whole country
and set differentiated goals for each region. In January 2014, the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP) entered into “contracts” with all 31 provinces and set up a three-year air
quality plan to decrease the concentration of particulate matter (PM) in the whole country.
In each “contract”, an air quality target for 2017 was set – resulting in different percentage
reduction targets of PM2.5/PM10 for each province relative to the 2012 level.7
These centrally set targets are implemented by local government officials, who are in-
centivized to fulfill them through performance-based promotions. Promotions are the key
instrument used in China to ensure that local officials carry out policies in line with the
goals set by the central government (see Zheng and Kahn, 2013, 2017, for further discussion
of this topic). For a long time, the central government focused on economic performance
6The concentration of air pollutants in China is among the world’s highest and is a problem with serious
health consequences. Average PM2.5 (particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5 µm or less) concentrations
in 2013 were 91 µg/m3, which is nine times the amount the World Health Organization considers safe.
Estimates by Greenstone and Schwarz (2018) suggest that if these levels of pollution are sustained, it will
result in a 6.5 year decline in life expectancy for the average resident.
7For the list of targets by province, see Table C2 in Appendix C.
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and emphasized economic growth as the key evaluation criteria for local officials’ promotion
(Chen, Li, and Lu, 2018). However, from the 12th Five-Year Plan onward, the central gov-
ernment have used the fulfilment of environmental performance targets as a requirement for
the promotion of local mayors (Zheng and Kahn, 2013).
2.2 National Monitoring System
To address issues raised about limited coverage and quality of existing pollution data, the
central government introduced a new monitoring system as a part of its 2013 National
Air Quality Action Plan. This new system expanded coverage to all of China – introducing
monitors in prefecture-level cities that previously had no systematic air pollution monitoring
in place. In addition, cities with existing monitors received new updated monitors that could
capture the wider range of pollutants included in the revised air pollution standards (notably,
PM2.5, widely regarded as the key measure of ambient air pollution, was included for the
first time). One of the key features of the new system is that all monitoring stations report
six pollutants (SO2, NO2, CO, PM10, PM2.5, and O3) to the central government in real time
(Greenstone et al., 2019). Hourly pollution data is then automatically published online by
the central government.
The new monitors were installed in three separate phases. The first phase was conducted
in 2013 and focused on 74 major cities that represented the country’s key population and
economic centers.8 The second phase was implemented in 2014 and focused on an additional
87 cities, that were covered either because they were Environmental Improvement Priority
Cities or because they were part of a larger policy package aimed at improving environmen-
tal outcomes in the Shandong province.9 The primary aim of the first two phases was to
automate old manual monitors.10 The main expansion phase, which is the one we focus on
in this paper, was carried out in the following year when all 177 remaining prefecture-level
cities (53% of all prefecture-level divisions in China) installed monitors. After this final ex-
pansion, all prefecture-level cities had at least one air quality monitor. These monitors all
started transmitting information to the central government from January 1, 2015.
The MEP provided detailed instructions for how many monitors should be installed and
where they should be located. All the monitors were installed in the so called “built-up
area” – the main urban center of the prefecture-level city. The number of monitors installed
in each city was determined by the city’s population size and the geographical size of the
8The Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei Metropolitan Region, the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, directly
administered municipalities, and provincial capitals.
9See this link for a description of the policy package.
10113 out of the 161 cities in the first two waves had manual pollution monitoring in place before the new
monitors were introduced.
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built-up area. The detailed assignment criterion, which we use for identification, is presented
in Table C1. Each monitor’s precise location was chosen by a simulation method that took
surrounding buildings, traffic, and the direction of seasonal winds into account to make sure
that the monitors captured a fair representation of local pollution. The location of these
monitors is depicted in the map in Panel A of Figure D1.
The funding for the monitors was provided by the province-level environmental bureaus.
Once all equipment had been put in place, the city-level environmental bureau were made
responsible for the maintenance and operation of all monitors within the city. The local
governments, who have incentives to report low levels of pollution because of the perfor-
mance targets they face, could potentially do this by manipulating the recordings from the
monitors. Such manipulation was facilitated by the direct control of the monitors that the
local governments were given. Indeed, many media sources have reported that such manip-
ulation did occur.11 Figure D10 shows an example from a newspaper article documenting
such manipulation, where the pollution monitor is being sprayed with water to reduce the
recordings.
Realizing that the data provided by local environmental protection bureaus might not
be reliable, the MEP decided to contract the operation of the monitor stations to private
companies through a procurement process. According to official documents from the MEP,
all of the monitors were operated by private companies from November 1, 2016. Monitors
were procured through twelve contracts. Each contract was designed to involve monitors in
different provinces spread out over the country, to make it difficult for firms to select a given
area. Six companies were selected, and each of them won two contracts. Importantly, after
the monitors’ operation was taken over by the firms, all the operation costs are paid by the
MEP instead of the local government.
In addition to the regular monitors in the built-up area of each city, half of the cities
were also assigned one background monitor. There are two main differences between the
background monitors and the regular monitors: background monitors are installed outside
of the built-up area of the city and are usually placed in a local scenic area; more importantly,
the readings from the background monitors are not used in the performance evaluation of
local officials. Due to the different nature of the background monitors, we are not including
them in the main analysis.12 In section 5.3, we show suggestive evidence that background
monitors were subject to less manipulation.
11See https://p.dw.com/p/32jqR and http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-08/09/c_
1123244676.htm, for two examples.
12Including them in the analysis does not alter any of our results. This is due to the fact that there is a
limited number of firms located close to the background monitors. We also check robustness of our main
results to controlling for whether a city has a background monitor.
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2.3 Conceptual Framework
As discussed in the previous section, the central government regulates (e.g., sets pollution
standards), while the local government is responsible for enforcing these regulations (e.g.,
by issuing fines to firms’ violating existing regulations). Our interest is in understanding
to what extent the introduction of monitors helps the central government hold the local
government accountable for their actions and how that affects enforcement behavior and
pollution at the local level.
To capture this effect we focus on cities that face the same regulations and receive mon-
itoring for the first time.13 Figure 1 illustrates how the introduction of monitors changes
access to information on pollution both within and between cities. Within cities, monitors
provide information on pollution for firms located close to the monitor, but not for those
located further away.14 Between cities, information on a larger share of overall pollution will
be available for those cities that were assigned a greater number of monitors (indicated by
the thicker dashed arrow from city B in Figure 1).15
Hence, the monitoring program that we study changes the capacity of the central gov-
ernment to collect information about pollution. This capacity changes both at the extensive
margin (covering some firms but not others) and at the intensive margin (covering a larger
vs. smaller share of firms in a city). In addition to the change in monitoring capacity in
2015, the reassignment of monitors from the local government to external third parties in
2016 changes the information provision process and decouples the responsibility of provid-
ing information with the responsibility to enforce regulations. The intention of the central
government is that this shift should improve data quality and reduce the scope for manip-
ulation. Because third parties are paid directly by the MEP, their incentives are arguably
more aligned with those of the central rather than the local government.16 In our analysis
13As discussed above, pollution reduction targets differ across some regions in China. We implement a
number of strategies to ensure that we do not capture differences in pollution targets, including controlling
for target by time fixed effects in all specifications and ensuring that these targets are balanced in our
regression discontinuity design.
14There is no exact cutoff for how far away from the monitor pollution could be picked up. For example,
anecdotal evidence discussed in Appendix D suggests that environmental officials are concerned with pol-
lution from firms within 5 km of a monitor. Schlenker and Walker (2015) show that health effects can be
picked up 20 km from a polluting source, suggesting that monitor might be able to pick up differences at
such a distance. We take a flexible approach in our analysis and let the data inform us about this cutoff.
15This is because a larger share of the potential polluters in a city will be covered. Note that this does
not need to be mechanically true because the central government guidelines reported in Table C1 stipulate
that larger cities are assigned a larger number of monitors. We document that additional monitors imply
greater coverage in Figure 4, which shows the relationship between the assigned number of monitors and
the average distance from a firm to its closest monitor. As shown in the figure, the average distance drops
monotonically with the number of assigned monitors.
16This follows a similar logic to Duflo et al. (2013), who document that the incentives that third-party
auditors face affect their reporting.
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Notes: This figure describes how the flow of information changes with the introduction
of monitors. While responsibilities are unchanged – the central government regulates
and the local government enforces these regulations – the quality of information changes
differently between cities. Starting in January 2015, a different number of monitors
transfer pollution recordings via the cities to the central government. Following the
retraction of the monitors in November 2016, the recordings from the monitors are
transferred to the central government via external third parties.
we will mainly focus on the overall effect of the monitors. However, in Section 5.3 we will
shed some light on the potential importance of who is responsible for information provision.
3 Data
In this article, we combine several data sources that provide comprehensive information on
the enforcement of environmental regulation and air pollution performance in cities that
introduced air pollution monitors in 2015. Section 3.1 describes the new data on local air
pollution enforcement that we collect and digitize. After that, Section 3.2 describes the two
sets of data that we use to measure air pollution: a satellite-based measure of the AOD and
data from the monitoring stations. Finally, Section 3.3 discusses the summary statistics for
our three main samples. Additional details on data processing and on supplementary data
sets used are provided in Appendix A.
3.1 Enforcement Records and Firm Data
To fully understand the impact of new air quality monitors on enforcement activities and
the consequences of those activities, we face some data-related empirical challenges: first,
the need to measure the quantity (and the quality) of governments’ enforcement activities,
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and second, the need to link enforcement activities to the location of air quality monitors.
We address these challenges by constructing a new data set on local enforcement of air
pollution regulation in China using records collected from local environmental bureaus by
the Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPE). To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first attempt to fully track enforcement activities carried out by local environmental
bureaus in China. To identify where these enforcement activities occur, we geo-reference all
major manufacturing firms in China using the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF)
and link these to the IPE records.17
Enforcement Records We collected all 55,000 enforcement records carried out from 2010
to 2017 in the 177 prefecture-level cities in our sample. Figure A1 in Appendix A provides
an example of what these records look like and the type of information they contain. Each
record includes details about the violating firm, a description of the violation, a reference
to the regulation that has been violated, and the local environmental bureau’s enforcement
action. Using a classification algorithm described in detail in Appendix A.1, we categorize
enforcement records in two dimensions. First, we identify what type of violation has been
logged and whether this relates to air pollution, water pollution, waste pollution, or pro-
cedural violations. In total, we classify 22,000 records as being related to violations of air
pollution regulations. Second, we identify what type of action has been taken by the local
environmental bureau. For 95% of the enforcement records related to air pollution, the ac-
tions belong to one or several of the following four categories: suspending production (53%),
ordering replacement/upgrading of the equipment (55%), levying fines (48%) or issuing a
warning (17%).
Firm Data and Geo-referencing To be able to track where and against which firms
that local environmental bureaus choose to enforce regulations, we use data from the 2013
ASIF. This survey is conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). It includes all
state-owned industrial enterprises (SOEs) and all private industrial enterprises with annual
sales exceeding 5 million Chinese yuan. This corresponds to about 90% of all manufacturing
firms in China and thus covers all major industrial polluters.18 Previous versions of the
ASIF data have been used in a number of papers (see, e.g., Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti,
17There are two main reasons why we think these records accurately reflect the actions of local governments
and are subject to limited misreporting. First, these records are only used for local administrative purposes
and are not tied to central government performance evaluations. IPE collect records directly from local
government agencies, since they are not held by the central government. Hence, local governments do not
face incentives to misreport enforcement actions. Second, any misreporting is made difficult by the nature
of the records since they capture public information on actual punishments imposed on local firms.
18According to the economic census 2004, firms in the ASIF represent 89.5% of the total revenue of all
manufacturing firms in China.
12
2011; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012; Huang et al., 2017). We focus on the
2013 version of the survey, which is the latest available, to gain an understanding of the
underlying distribution of manufacturing firms at the time of the introduction of monitors.
Before linking the data to the enforcement records, we use detailed firm address information
to identify the exact geographical location of all firms in the data. The process used for this
geo-referencing is outlined in Appendix A.1. Panel C in Figure D1 shows the location of all
the ASIF firms in our sample. Finally, we link our collection of enforcement records to the
underlying distribution of manufacturing firms in the ASIF. Out of our 55,000 records, 52%
of them refer to enforcement actions against firms in the ASIF data. Panel D in Figure D1
shows the geographical distribution of enforcement activities against these manufacturing
firms.
3.2 Air Pollution Data
Monitor Data: PM2.5, PM10 & AQI Air pollution data for the 552 monitoring stations
in the 177 prefecture-level cities in our sample is published online by the MEP from the
introduction of the monitors in January 2015.19 The MEP website reports hourly data
of SO2, NO2, CO, PM10, PM2.5, and O3. An air quality index (AQI) based on these six
pollutants is also constructed and reported.20 The AQI ranges from 0 to 500. It is further
divided into six ranges: 0− 50, 51− 100, 101− 150, 151− 200, 201− 300 and 301− 500. In
public reports, these are categorized as excellent, good, lightly polluted, moderately polluted,
heavily polluted, and severely polluted, respectively. We scrape pollution data from the MEP
website and focus on the two main indicators used as targets in the National Air Quality
Action Plan (PM10 and PM2.5) as well as the AQI. To facilitate comparison with our other
pollution measure described below, we aggregate the monitor data at the monthly level.
Satellite Data: Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) Before the expansion of the monitor-
ing system, none of the cities in our sample had any pollution monitoring. To obtain an
objective measure of pollution both before and after monitor construction, we use data on
AOD captured by the NASA MODIS satellites. AOD measures the degree to which aerosol
particles prevent the transmission of light by absorption or scattering and can therefore be
used as a measure of local pollution. Formally, Aerosol Optical Depth is defined as the neg-
19http://106.37.208.233:20035/
20The AQI is calculated using the following equation: AQI = max{IAQI1, IAQI2, ...IAQI6}, where each
Individual Air Quality Index (IAQI) is given by IAQIi = Ih−IlCh−Cl (C − Cl) + Il. The formula to compute
IAQI is the same one used in the United States, but with differences in parameters (Ch, Cl, Ih, and Il).
C is the pollutant concentration measured by the air quality monitor. Ch and Cl are the concentration
breakpoints, and Ih and Il the index breakpoints. More details about these parameters can be found here
https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/fgbz/bz/bzwb/jcffbz/201203/t20120302_224166.shtml.
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ative of the natural logarithm of the fraction of radiation (e.g., light) that is not scattered or
absorbed. Hence, estimates of AOD in this paper can be interpreted as percentage changes.
Monthly information on AOD is available at 0.1 by 0.1 degrees since 2000. In this project,
we combine measures from the MODIS Aqua and Terra satellites to calculate the mean of
AOD in a given month and city. To deal with potential within-city spillovers in pollution, we
calculate this measure based on the whole prefecture-level city polygon, as depicted in Panel
B of Figure D1. This figure shows the distribution of average AOD in 2010, the first year of
our analysis, across all cities in our sample. As indicated in the figure there is substantial
cross-sectional variation in pollution in our sample. The mean of AOD in the data is 0.34,
and the standard deviation is 0.23.
AOD has been shown to be highly correlated with ground-based measures of pollution
(see, e.g., Wang and Christopher, 2003; Gupta et al., 2006).21 While AOD data has been
used in various studies to measure air pollution (see, e.g., Chen et al., 2013; Jia, 2017),
only a few studies have internally verified the correlation between AOD and local ground-
based measures. To ensure the validity of AOD data in our setting, we take advantage of
the ground-based measures of pollution that are available after the expansion to study the
correlation between the AOD data and the two most common measures of air pollution
(PM2.5 and PM10) as well as the joint Air Quality Index (AQI).22 In Table C3, we report
results from regressions controlling for monitor fixed effects, time fixed effects as well as
precipitation, temperature, and mayor’s age. Column (1) shows the estimate for PM2.5,
which is 0.33. This is largely comparable with the correlations reported by Gupta et al.
(2006). Estimates for PM10 and AQI are smaller but of a broadly similar magnitude. Taken
together, this suggests that AOD is a suitable measure for local air pollution and that it
most strongly reflects changes in PM2.5.
3.3 Main Sample and Summary Statistics
To supplement our analysis, we collect additional data on: monthly weather conditions,
résumés of all mayors during our sample period and city level aggregates of citizens’ online
searches for a set of keywords related to pollution. Appendix A.3 describes this additional
data in detail and the procedure used for collecting it. Using the data on pollution and
enforcement described above together with these additional sources, we construct three main
21Wang and Christopher (2003) find that the correlation coefficient between the monthly means of AOD
and PM2.5 is around 0.7 using data in Alabama in 2002. Using much more comprehensive data, Gupta et al.
(2006) find that the correlation ranges from 0.14 to 0.6 for a number of cities across the world.
22For this analysis we match monitors with AOD data from the intersecting pixel (0.1 by 0.1 degrees).
If data is missing for this pixel, we interpolate and calculate the average AOD measure for all surrounding
pixels. All results are robust to using data at the city level instead.
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samples for our analysis – all covering the 177 prefecture-level cities that installed monitors
in 2015. Summary statistics for these three samples is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Obs. Periods Freq.
Panel A: Firm-Level Data
Any Air Pollution Enforcement 0.013 0.11 288848 2010-2017 Yearly
Suspension 0.0073 0.085 288848 2010-2017 Yearly
Upgrading 0.0078 0.088 288848 2010-2017 Yearly
Fine 0.0067 0.081 288848 2010-2017 Yearly
Warning 0.0016 0.040 288848 2010-2017 Yearly
Any Water Pollu. Enforce. 0.0091 0.095 288848 2010-2017 Yearly
Any Solid Waste Pollu. Enforce. 0.0031 0.056 288848 2010-2017 Yearly
Any Procedure Pollu. Enforce. 0.0075 0.086 288848 2010-2017 Yearly
Monitor within 10 km 0.40 0.49 36106 2013 Cross Sec.
Distance to Monitor (km) 19.2 15.4 36106 2013 Cross Sec.
Owner: SOEs 0.094 0.29 36106 2013 Cross Sec.
Owner: Private 0.82 0.38 36106 2013 Cross Sec.
Owner: Foreign 0.041 0.20 36106 2013 Cross Sec.
Owner: Other 0.040 0.20 36106 2013 Cross Sec.
Year Started 2003.2 7.92 36106 2013 Cross Sec.
Employment 434.8 1076.4 36106 2013 Cross Sec.
Revenue 278716 1656811 36106 2013 Cross Sec.
Panel B: City-Level Data
Number of Monitors 2.75 1.08 16992 2010-2017 Monthly
Urban Population (10,000) 33.8 21.0 16992 2010-2017 Monthly
Size of Built-up Area (km2) 46.8 27.2 16992 2010-2017 Monthly
Age of the Mayor 51.7 6.32 16992 2010-2017 Monthly
Precipitation (mm) 3.38 4.27 16992 2010-2017 Monthly
Mean Temperature 10.5 11.4 16992 2010-2017 Monthly
Aerosol Optical Depth 0.34 0.23 16319 2010-2017 Monthly
# Firms with Any Air Pollu. Enforce. 10.38 24.94 1416 2010-2017 Yearly
# ASIF Firms with Any Air Pollu. Enforce. 4.28 7.65 1416 2010-2017 Yearly
Search Index: air pollution 1.89 4.38 14610 2011-2017 Monthly
Search Index: haze/smog 18.10 30.62 14610 2011-2017 Monthly
Search Index: PM2.5 0.20 1.63 14610 2011-2017 Monthly
Search Index: air mask 5.53 8.51 14610 2011-2017 Monthly
Search Index: air purifier 22.40 25.97 14610 2011-2017 Monthly
Panel C: Monitor-Level Data
Particulate Matter 2.5 (PM2.5) 44.8 26.9 19185 2015-2017 Monthly
Particulate Matter 10 (PM10) 79.0 50.9 19185 2015-2017 Monthly
Air Quality Index (AQI) 71.0 33.1 19185 2015-2017 Monthly
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the samples used in our analyses. The data cover the
177 cities that installed monitors in 2015. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the data of firm-level
enforcement. We rely on the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) 2013 and restrict the sample to
include only firms set up before 2010 and located within 50 km of an air quality monitor. Panel B reports
the summary statistics for city-level analysis. Panel C reports the summary statistics of three monthly
pollution indicators. The monthly data is averaged from real-time readings of 552 monitors in 177 cities.
Panel A reports information for the firm-level data. We rely on the 2013 ASIF and restrict
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the sample to firms that started operating before 2010 (the first year of our analysis) and that
are located within 50 km of an air quality monitor.23 This leaves us with a total sample of
36,106 firms. The majority of these firms are private (82%) and cover a wide range of different
industries (Table C4 reports the industry composition for our sample).24 On average, the
firms in our sample are located 19 km from a monitor. However, as depicted in Figure D6
the spatial distribution of firms is skewed and 40% of firms are located within 10km from a
monitor. For a given firm in our sample, the probability of receiving an air pollution related
enforcement action is 1.3%. Such an enforcement action most commonly requests the firm
to upgrade their equipment, but suspension of operation and issuing fines are also common.
Violations relating to water pollution regulations or conducting a procedural violation are less
common, but of a comparable magnitude (0.9% and 0.75%, respectively). Most (more than
75%) of the enforcement actions were taken after the introduction of air quality monitors.
Panel B reports the summary statistics for the city-level data. For this sample we consider
pollution as well as enforcement at the aggregate city level.25 The cities we study are small
by Chinese standards and have an average population of around 340,000. The average size
of our sample (measured by both the urban population and the size of build-up area) are one
third of the country average. However, the air pollution level in our sample (measured by
AOD) is only slightly lower (10%) than the country average.26 On average the cities in our
sample have 2.75 monitors installed and about 10 firms face an environmental enforcement
actions related to air pollution per year (on average 1.77 per year before 2015 and 22.73 per
year afterwards).
Panel C reports the summary statistics for the monitor-level data for the three pollution
measures we use. This data is aggregated at the monitor-month level and covers data from
all 552 monitors installed in the 177 cities that we study. The sample period for this data
starts in January 2015, when all the monitors have been installed.
4 Impact of the Monitors
This section describes the impact of monitoring on local government enforcement activities
and pollution. First, we conduct a firm-level analysis in Section 4.1. We start by describ-
23Note that while we have yearly information on enforcement actions, our information on firm character-
istics is from the 2013 ASIF and therefore cross-sectional.
24Note that this table reports 2-digit industry codes, while we use 4-digit industry codes when estimating
industry fixed effects in our analysis.
25Hence, this sample is not restricted to firms within 50 km from a monitor and covers the whole city
polygon as depicted in Figure D1.
26Appendix A.2 discusses additional details regarding the representativeness of our sample and compares
it to other cities in China.
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ing the general patterns before presenting the main empirical strategy and results showing
how monitors affect enforcement activities. Thereafter, we investigate how the information
provided by the monitors shape the enforcement response. In Section 4.2, we move from
studying the local effects of monitoring to the aggregate city effects – exploiting differences
in the number of monitors induced by the new monitoring program.
4.1 Firm-Level Evidence
Before conducting a formal analysis, we start by investigating the spatial distribution of
enforcement activities and how these change with the introduction of monitors. Figure
2a shows a binned scatter plot of the probability that a firm has any enforcement record
related to air pollution in a year on the distance to the closest monitor. Black dots indicate
the mean probability during the period before air quality monitors were introduced, red
diamonds show the mean probability in the post-period. The two lines represent the linear
fit of the data before and after the introduction of monitors. The graph shows that the
average yearly probability of a firm receiving any air pollution-related enforcement action is
around 0.0067 before 2015 and that this probability does not seem to depend on the distance
to the (planned) monitor (i.e., there is no gradient in enforcement activity in the pre-period).
This provides some first evidence suggesting that monitors are not endogenously placed in
localities with differential enforcement activities.27 However, during the post-period we see a
substantial increase in the enforcement activity – in particular enforcement against firms close
to the monitor. Figure 2b estimates the gradient in enforcement activities nonparametrically
and shows that enforcement activities increase by about 1 percentage point within 0–5 km
from the monitor and by about 0.6 percentage points 10–15 km from the monitors, while
there is no statistically significant impact on enforcement beyond this point.28 This change
in spatial pattern is also noticeable by visual inspection of the raw data.29
27While this is reassuring, the identification assumption for our main analysis is on the trends as opposed
to the levels of enforcement activity. We provide a test of this assumption in the following section.
28Formally, we estimate the following equation:






where mdit is an indicator for there being a monitor within distance d from firm i in year t; and all other
variables are the same as in Equation 1. Hence, we are here estimating the average change in enforcement
in the post-period relative to the pre-period (instead of estimating effects by year).
29Figure D2 in the Appendix shows a map of cities in central China depicting the location of air quality
monitors, the underlying distribution of manufacturing firms as well as the geographical location of enforce-
ment activities related to air pollution before (in blue) and after (in red) the introduction of monitors in
2015.
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The above results are consistent with extensive media reporting that local environmental
bureaus step up environmental inspections close to the monitors. We document some of this
evidence in Figure D9 in Appendix D, which shows a list of news articles generated from
a search on the Chinese search engine Baidu using the keywords “monitors”, “surrounding
area”, and “check”. The list includes a large number of articles discussing how local govern-
ments organize their environmental inspections around the monitors. Some examples include
cities that draw special zones around their air quality monitors and send teams of inspec-
tors to those zones, to ensure that firms comply with national environmental regulations.
Other sources mention that city governments hire volunteers from the public to inspect air
pollution from venues (such as restaurants) within a certain distance from the monitors.
Finally, several sources suggest that mayors take a special interest in these inspections by,
for example, directly appointing officials to this task or by visiting surrounding areas. This
further underlines the weight that mayors put on the recordings from the monitors because
of the performance incentives that they face.
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(b) Nonparametric Estimates
Notes: Figure 2a shows a binned scatter plots of the relationship between enforcement
activity and distance to the closest monitor. Black dots indicate the mean probability
of air pollution-related enforcement before introducing the air quality monitors, while
red diamonds show the mean probability after the introduction of monitors. Figure
2b shows the relative increase in enforcement for each distance bin after 2015. Error
spikes represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
Firm Level: Event Study
To investigate the relationship between monitors and enforcement formally, we estimate a
flexible nonparametric event study specification. If we denote a generic firm by i, with
i ∈ j, p, where j denotes a 4-digit industry, p denotes a province and t a generic year, our
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model can be written as:









i + λXit + ϵijpt (1)
where yijpt is an indicator for enforcement, δi is a firm fixed effect, θjt and ηpt represent,
respectively, industry-by-year and province-by-year fixed effects, mdki is an indicator for any
monitor being within d km from a firm in year k, Xit denotes weather controls and ϵijpt is the
error term. Because we condition on firm as well as on industry-by-year and province-by-year
fixed effects, parameter estimates capture the average (across industries and provinces) effect
of monitoring on the differential change in enforcement across firms in the same industry
or province. This specification addresses two important concerns. First, we ensure that
we estimate the impact of monitoring within the same regulatory environment (pollution
reduction targets vary across provinces as discussed in Section 2). Second, we allow for
different enforcement trends depending on local industrial composition at baseline. We use
the year before the introduction of the monitors and firms 20–50 km from the monitor as
reference categories and estimate βdk for d ∈ {0–5 km, 5–10 km, 10–15 km, 15–20 km}.
Equation 1 allows us to estimate the temporal and spatial relationship between monitors
and enforcement activity. Hence, it is informative about the key identification assumption
for our analysis (parallel trends in enforcement for firms located at different distances from
the monitors) as well as the spatial reach of monitors. We cluster standard errors at the city
level to account for correlation of errors across firms and time within cities.30
Figure 3 reports the results from estimating Equation 1. We present the estimates in
four separate event study graphs each showing how enforcement activity changes around the
introduction of monitors for firms within 0–5 km, 5–10 km, 10–15 km and 15–20 km from the
monitors relative to firms 20–50km from the monitors (the reference category). In all four
graphs, there is no evidence of any differential trends leading up to the intervention – lending
credibility to the main identification assumption of parallel trends. After the introduction
of the monitors we see a substantial increase in enforcement activity close to the monitors.
This step-up in enforcement is particularly pronounced within 0–5 km from the monitors,
but is noticeable also for firms 5–10 km and 10–15 km from the monitor. For firms 15–20 km
from the monitor there is no differential change in enforcement activity during our sample
period. These results mirror the gradient observed in Figure 2.
30As a robustness check, we also report standard errors based on the spatial HAC variance estimator
proposed by Conley (1999), which allows for correlation between areas that are geographically close but
belong to different administrative units (See Panel A of Table 2). These standard errors are smaller, but
overall similar, to our baseline standard errors. We focus on the city-level clustered standard errors since
these are more conservative.
19


































































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Year
(d) 15–20 km
Notes: The figure shows the estimates of the nonparametric event study using Equa-
tion 1. The sub-figures report event studies for firms within each distance bin. The
reference group is firms located 20–50 km from the closest monitor. Error spikes repre-
sent 95 percent confidence intervals, calculated using robust standard errors clustered
at the city level.
Firm Level: Main Results
Guided by the results in the previous section, we use a simplified difference-in-differences
specification to provide an aggregate estimate of the magnitude of the effect. This specifica-
tion compares firms within and beyond 10 km from a monitor.31 The results from estimating
this specification are shown in Table 2. The first column of Panel A reports estimates on
31Formally, we estimate:
yijpt = δi + θjt + ηpt + βm
10km
it + λXit + ϵijpt,
, where m10kmit is an indicator for a firm having a monitor within 10 km and all other variables are the
same as in Equation 1. To the extent that firms beyond 10 km from the monitors are also affected, this
specification provides a lower bound for the true causal effect.
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whether any air pollution-related enforcement took place (i.e., the same outcome as in fig-
ures 2 and 3). Results suggest that the probability of a firm within 10 km from a monitor
receiving an enforcement action in a year is 0.78 percentage points higher compared to firms
further away from the monitor. This suggests that a monitor increases the probability of an
air pollution-related enforcement activity occurring by 60% compared to the average yearly
probability of enforcement (1.3). The remaining columns of Panel A in Table 2 shed light on
what type of action that was taken by the local government, by estimating the same model
for the four most common enforcement classifications we identify in the data (“suspension”
– suspending production of the whole factory or part of the factory; “upgrading” – ordering
replacement/upgrading of the equipment, levying a “fine” or issuing a “warning”). We find
similar estimates for the first three categories and no effect for the last type (“warning”).
These results suggest that the local environmental bureau is responding to the monitors by
implementing costly punishments on local firms.
One potential concern with the above results is whether monitors are placed in strategi-
cally important locations within the city where the local government has a greater interest
in enforcing environmental regulations after 2015 (e.g., because of greater health benefits to
the local population or because of lower costs of enforcement for the environmental bureau).
The patterns observed in Figure 2a suggest that at least in terms of pre-policy enforcement
that is not the case. To further investigate this concern we conduct two additional tests.
First, we use the same baseline specification to look at environmental enforcement that is
not related to air pollution. The results are reported in Table C5 in the Appendix. For
enforcement related to water pollution, solid waste pollution, and procedure violation, esti-
mates are small and statistically insignificant. Second, we conduct placebo tests in which we
estimate the specification used to produce Figure 2b, but instead of the minimum distance
to the monitor we use the distance to the local environmental bureau or the distance to the
city’s firm centroid.32 Figure D3 of Appendix D shows that there are no detectable changes
in the gradients of enforcement activity pre and post 2015. To further validate our main
results, we include the distances to both the environmental bureau and the firm centroid
in our main specification and interact the distance bins with the time fixed effects. Due to
the high correlation between monitor location and these measures our results are slightly
less precise, but largely unaffected when including this full set of controls.33 Taken together,
these results suggest that the step-up in enforcement behavior that we observe is indeed
32We do this to investigate whether enforcement is guided by the spatial distribution of firms. To calculate
centroids for each city, we use the geographical distribution of all ASIF firms. The firm centroid is a single
point representing the barycenter of all firms.
33The main estimate in Column (1) of Panel A in Table 2 changes from 0.0078 to 0.0051 and is significant
at the 5%-level.
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Table 2. Monitors and Enforcement Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Any Enforcement Action
Outcome Air Suspension Upgrading Fine Warning
Mon<10km × Post 0.0078*** 0.0043*** 0.0041*** 0.0043*** -0.00012
(0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.00030)
[0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.00026]
Mean of dependent variable 0.013 0.0073 0.0078 0.0067 0.0016
Observations 288696 288696 288696 288696 288696
Panel B: Intensity and Leniency
Outcome Air Low Intensity High Intensity Lenient Strict
Mon<10km × Post 0.0068*** 0.0071*** -0.00025 0.0027*** 0.0015*
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.00050) (0.00060) (0.00088)
Mon<10km × Post × High polluter 0.030* 0.0054 0.025** -0.017** 0.040***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.0067) (0.011)
Mean of dependent variable 0.013 0.011 0.0023 0.0026 0.0045
Observations 288696 288696 288696 288696 288696
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of the impact of air pollution monitoring on the probability of being
subject to different air pollution-related enforcement actions by the local government. Each coefficient is
from a separate difference-in-differences regression. All regressions control for fixed effects specific to firm,
industry-by-year interactions, and province-by-year interactions. Robust standard errors clustered on the
city in parentheses. In Panel A, standard errors based on the spatial HAC technique suggested by Conley
(1999) are reported in brackets, using a bartlett kernel and bandwidth of 100 kilometers. Panel B reports
heterogeneity for firms identified as high polluters according to ESR during the pre-period. The outcome
“low intensity” (“high intensity”) corresponds to a dummy variable indicating that a firm received only one
(at least two) enforcement actions in a year. The outcome “lenient” is a dummy variable that equals one if
only one punishment (among “suspension”, “upgrading”, and “fine”) is issued against a firm in a year. In
contrast, the dummy variable “strict” is defined as one if all three types of punishments are issued against
a firm in a year. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
driven by the monitors.
Firm Level: Targeting and Enforcement Efficiency
In the previous sub-section, we showed that local governments respond to monitoring by
increasing the probability of enforcement. In this sub-section we will explore whether moni-
toring also affect other aspects of enforcement activities. We do this in two ways. First, we
study which firms that are targeted by the local governments and if the intensity and strict-
ness of enforcement that they face changes with the introduction of monitors. Second, we
investigate how monitors shape the responsiveness of enforcement actions to local pollution
levels.
To better understand which firms that local governments target and whether this tar-
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geting changes with the introduction of monitors, we study actions against a set of high
polluting firms. We rely on the Environmental Survey and Reporting Database (ESR) to
identify these firms. The ESR is put together by the central government and includes firms
that are considered to be major polluters (in total responsible for 65% of local emissions).34
In Panel B of Table 2, we estimate the differential enforcement response against these firms.
The estimates in Column (1) suggest that there is a larger increase in the overall probability
of enforcement against these firms (significant at the 10% level). The following four columns
report what type of enforcement these firms receive. We start by differentiating between
low and high enforcement intensity, where we define low as receiving one enforcement action
in a year and high as receiving more than one action. The results in columns (2)-(3) show
that low-intensity enforcement is not significantly different between low and high polluting
firms, but that all high-intensity enforcement focuses on key polluters in the presence of
monitoring. Next, we consider the strictness of enforcement action. To capture this, we
construct two additional dummy variables that classify enforcement records as either lenient
or strict. Since there is no clear ranking of the three main punishment types discussed above
(“suspension”, “upgrading”, and “fine”) and enforcement records often include multiple pun-
ishments, we consider the two extreme cases where either one (lenient) or all three (strict)
punishments are issued against a firm in a year. The last two columns in Table 2 reports
the results and show that high polluting firms are less likely to receive lenient treatment and
more likely to receive strict enforcement action. Taken together, these results suggest that
local governments respond to monitoring by shifting both the intensity and the strictness of
enforcement towards high polluters.
We conduct an additional analysis to investigate whether monitors make local govern-
ments’ enforcement efforts more responsive to local pollution levels. The main empirical
challenge inherent in studying this is the endogeneity of local pollution. To overcome this
challenge, we take advantage of local rainfall shocks, which are important determinants of
local pollution levels since heavy rainfall makes pollution less severe.35 We start by docu-
menting this empirically. For each monitor–month pair, we construct an indicator (Rain>x̃)
for whether rainfall is above the median in that pair or not. Hence, this variable captures
year-on-year fluctuations in rainfall (i.e., comparing a rainy January with a dry January).
We focus on yearly variation because this is the highest temporal frequency that we have
34The ESR database has been used in several recent paper (see, e.g. He, Wang, and Zhang, 2020). We
use the ESR firms identified between 2010 and 2014, the period before introducing air quality monitors. In
total, this corresponds to 1,445 of the firms in our baseline firm sample.
35An alternative strategy used in previous literature is to exploit inversion episodes (Arceo, Hanna, and
Oliva, 2016; Jans, Johansson, and Nilsson, 2018; Deschenes et al., 2020). While inversion episodes are strong
predictors of pollution levels with high frequency data in our setting (hourly or daily), they are not predictive
of annual pollution levels, which we need to use due to the yearly frequency of the enforcement data.
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for the enforcement records.36 Columns (1) - (4) in Table 3 show estimates of the rela-
tionship between pollution recordings and rainfall shocks from a regression controlling for
monitor and time fixed effects. Results show that average pollution recordings are consis-
tently about 5% lower in years with above median rainfall. These effects are substantially
stronger at higher levels of pollution, which are arguably more important for local policy
response, where, e.g., the share of days that are considered heavily polluted (AQI>200) are
reduced by 17% (.0038/.022).
We then explore how enforcement activities respond to monitors in the presence of rainfall
shocks by estimating an augmented version of our baseline model that interacts the effect
of monitors with rainfall shocks. We prefer taking this reduced form approach instead
of instrumenting local pollution levels. The reason for this is that polluting firms might
endogenously respond to rainfall shocks, e.g., by polluting more during heavy rainfall leading
the above results to be lower bounds. Reduced form interactions are reported in Column
(5) of Table 3. There are two main takeaways from these results. First, they document
that enforcement activities do not respond to rainfall shocks in the absence of monitors.
Second, it shows that the effect of monitors on enforcement is about half the size (0.011–
0.0051=0.0059) when rainfall levels are above the median – i.e., when pollution levels are
lower – as opposed to when rainfall levels are below the median (0.011) – when pollution
levels are higher. These results suggest that the information captured by the monitors is
important for the enforcement actions taken by the local governments and that the monitors
make the local government more responsive to changes in local pollution.
The results above could be driven by two channels: 1) that local governments respond
more strongly to higher pollution levels close to the monitor in the post-period or 2) that
they respond more strongly to higher pollution levels in general after the introduction of the
monitors. Both these channels could contribute to increased responsiveness as long as the
recordings from the monitors are informative about the overall pollution level in the city.
To shed further light on which of these two mechanisms is driving the results, we estimate
the model with the full set of interactions.37 Column (6) in Table 3 reports the results from
estimating this model and shows suggestive evidence (significant at the 10%-level) that both
the channels discussed above seem to be at play. There is a weaker response in general during
36An alternative way of doing this is to instead aggregate the data to the yearly level. This produces






i ×Postt+β2m10kmi ×Postt×r>x̃it +β3m10kmi ×r>x̃it +β4Postt×r>x̃it +λXit+ϵijpt
where m10kmi is an indicator for a firm being located within 10 km from a monitor, Postt indicates the
post-period (i.e. from 2015 onward) and r>x̃it is an indicator for rainfall being above the median in a city.
All other variables are the same as in Equation 1.
24
the post-period when rainfall is high (low pollution), but this effect is even stronger closer
to the monitor. The results also provide additional support for the validity of this exercise
by showing that there is no differential response to rainfall shocks in the pre-period in areas
close to the monitors compared to areas further away.
Table 3. Rainfall, Pollution Recordings and Enforcement Response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: log(x̄) Share of Days Indicator (0/1)
PM2.5 PM10 AQI AQI>200 Any Enforcement
Rain>x̃ -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.042*** -0.0038** -0.00044 0.00074
(0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.00077)
Mon<10km × Post 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.0021) (0.0024)
Mon<10km × Post × Rain>x̃ -0.0051*** -0.0043*
(0.0018) (0.0026)
Mon<10km × Rain>x̃ 0.0011
(0.00098)
Post × Rain>x̃ -0.0041*
(0.0024)
Monitor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Province-Year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Mean Outcome 3.64 4.23 4.17 0.022 0.012 0.012
Observations 19185 19185 19185 19185 288720 288720
R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.42 0.24 0.24
Notes: This table reports the effect of precipitation shocks on pollution (columns 1–4) and the differential
effect of monitors on enforcement activities during precipitation shocks (columns 5–6). Rain>x̃ is an indicator
variable identifying time periods when precipitation is above the median rainfall in a city during the main
sample period. To ensure comparability between the monthly temporal resolution in the first analysis
(columns 1–4) and the yearly temporal resolution in the second, the first analysis calculates precipitation
shocks within months across years (i.e. comparing a rainy January with a dry January). This analysis
investigates the relationship between precipitation and four monitor-based measures of air pollution: PM2.5,
PM10, the combined AQI, and the share of days when the air quality index is above the critical value (200).
Each column is from a separate regression. Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parentheses. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
4.2 City-Level Evidence
In this section we move from studying the extensive margin impact of monitors at the firm
level to investigate the aggregate intensive margin effects at the city level. This approach
allows us to infer the overall impact of a more extensive monitoring program on both enforce-
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ment and pollution. To conduct this analysis, we exploit the criteria set up by the central
government when implementing the monitoring program (listed in Table C1 in Appendix C)
and compare outcomes in cities that installed different numbers of monitors. The argument
behind this approach is that a greater number of monitors will cover a larger share of the
firms in a city and therefore hold officials accountable for a greater share of the overall po-
tential polluters. Figure 4 illustrates this point for our data by showing how the number of
monitors assigned to a city is related to the minimum distance between firms and monitors.
The figure shows that the distance to the closest monitor is substantially smaller in cities
with a larger number of monitors. Considering firms that are closest to the monitor (the
25th percentile) this distance drops by 75% from 40 km to 10 km for firms that are assigned
6 rather than 1 monitor.





































Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the distance to the closest monitor
and the number of monitors assigned to a city. Each symbol represents a bin showing
the average distance across all cities assigned that number of monitors (these numbers
corresponds to those reported in Table C1 in Appendix C). Four different distances are
reported: average distance for all firms in a city, the median distance to all firms in the
city, the distance to the 25th percentile (i.e. the closest firms) and the distance to the
75th percentile (i.e. the firms furthest away).
Source: Based on authors’ own calculations using the assigned number of monitors
reported in Table C1 and the geographical location of manufacturing firms described
in section 3.1.
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City Level: Event Study
To study the effects of monitoring at the city level, we first estimate a standard event study
specification. If we denote a generic city by c, with c ∈ r, where r denotes a pollution
reduction target group in Table C2, and t is a generic time period, our model can be written
as:






c + λXct + ϵcrt, (2)
where ycrt is either an aggregate measure of a city’s monthly AOD or the total yearly number
of firms that receive any enforcement related to air pollution regulations, mkc is either the
actual number of monitors in the city, or the predicted number of monitors according to
Table C1, in a given year k, δc are city fixed effects and γrt are pollution target group by
time fixed effect (month–year for the pollution specification and year for the enforcement
specification). The variable Xct represents time-varying characteristics of each city including:
monthly precipitation, monthly average temperature and the age fixed effects of the mayor
in office.38 The error term is denoted by ϵcrt, which we cluster at the city level to account
for potential serial correlation of the errors over time. Because we condition on city as well
as on pollution target-by-year fixed effects, parameter estimates capture the average effect
of monitoring on the differential change in pollution/enforcement across cities with the same
pollution reduction target.
To causally identify the impact of an additional monitor, we rely on common trends across
cities assigned different numbers of monitors. To assess the validity of this assumption, we
start by investigating the AOD trend for each group. In Figure 5a, we plot demeaned city-
level AOD trends in four groups, which are determined according to the minimum number of
monitors assigned by the central government. Two important patterns can be noted. First,
there is a relatively flat AOD trend in cities assigned one monitor, suggesting that there
was no major change in pollution in these cities and that it is therefore a suitable control
group.39 Second, and more importantly, raw AOD data in all four groups share a common
trend before 2015, after which AOD diverges – with a more substantial reduction for cities
assigned a larger number of monitors.
To formally test this, we estimate Equation 2 – setting the average pollution in the year
before monitors were installed as the baseline. Estimates from this specification are shown
in Figure 5b. We first estimate a standard event study specification using the actual number
38The inclusion of weather controls is motivated by the fact that ambient pollution has been shown to be
affected by local weather conditions in previous work (Schlenker and Walker, 2015; Barwick et al., 2020).
39As discussed in Section 2.3, all cities in China were assigned at least one monitor.
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of monitors installed in a city as our independent variable of interest. These estimates are
reported by the black dots on the graph. Results corroborate the findings above that there
are no differential trends in AOD leading up to the intervention. We also see a substantial
drop in pollution in the post-period for cities that installed additional monitors.40 These
effects are even stronger in the second and third year.
One potential concern with the above specification is that it might lead to biased results
if cities were able to influence the number of monitors installed. The estimates would be
biased if, for example, cities that expected lower pollution in the future installed a larger
number of monitors. To address this concern, we use the minimal number of monitors set
by the MEP as an instrument for the actual number of monitors (mc).41 The instrumental
variable estimates are marked by diamonds in Figure 5b. The coefficients follow the OLS
estimates closely, but are slightly less precisely estimated. Again, there is no evidence of
differential trends leading up to the intervention, supporting the common trend assumption
between cities of different sizes.










































Notes: Panel (a) presents demeaned city-level AOD trends in four groups. Groups
are determined according to the minimum number of monitors assigned according to
the regulation. The red line marks the introduction of air quality monitors. Panel
(b) presents the estimates from equation (2) using two different specifications (DiD,
DiD+IV). Black dots represent the coefficients from DiD, whereas diamonds represent
DiD+IV estimates. Error spikes represent 95 percent confidence intervals. AOD is
formally defined as the negative of the natural logarithm of the fraction of light that
is not scattered or absorbed. Hence, these estimates can be interpreted as percentage
changes in pollution.
40Note that monitors are operational from January 1, so all periods in the year of adoption are treated.
We report estimates by year rather than by month to facilitate comparison with the enforcement results.
41We report the first-stage estimates in Table 4.
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City Level: Main Results
Following the same structure as in the firm-level analysis, we use a simplified difference-
in-differences specification to provide aggregate estimates of the magnitude of the effect.42
Table 4 summarizes the main results from estimating different versions of this specification.
Panel A shows the effect of monitoring on air pollution measured by aerosol optical depth.
The first two columns use the difference-in-differences strategy by comparing the change
in pollution before and after the policy between cities that installed a different number of
monitors. The last two columns show the instrumental variable estimates. We only control
for city fixed effects and time fixed effects in the first and third column. We add pollution
target-by-year fixed effects and control for time-varying weather conditions and fixed effects
for the age of the mayor in office in the second and fourth column. The estimates consistently
show that one additional monitor leads to a 2.7–3 % decrease in air pollution as measured
by aerosol optical depth.43
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results from using the same specification as above to es-
timate the impact on our aggregate measure of enforcement activities: the logarithm of the
total number of firms that are subject to any air pollution-related enforcement in the city
in a year (or log(# firms) for short). We show results using both the simplified difference-
in-differences specification and the instrumental variable models with different controls. All
estimates are of a similar magnitude and show that one additional monitor leads to an in-
crease in air pollution-related enforcement of 13–19%. Event study results are reported in
Figure D4 in Appendix D and provide evidence suggesting that the parallel trends assump-
tion is valid for this analysis as well. Following the logic in the firm analysis in Section
4.1, we further show that the increase in enforcement is driven by enforcement against firms
located within 10 km from a monitor. Table C6 in Appendix C documents these results. As
a robustness check, we further investigate the impact of monitoring on the total number of
firms that face any enforcement in a city in a year (this includes firms that are not covered by
the ASIF survey). Panel B in Table C6 reports the results and show that the overall effects
are slightly smaller than the results for our baseline sample. This is driven by a weaker
impact on non-ASIF firms, which are much smaller entities (such as local restaurants) that
42Formally we estimate:
ycrt = δc + γrt + βmct + λXct + ϵcrt,
where mct is the number of monitors installed in city c in year t and all other variables are the same as in
Equation 2.
43Aerosol optical depth is formally defined as the negative of natural logarithm of the fraction of radiation
(e.g., light) that is not scattered or absorbed. Hence, these estimates can be interpreted as percentage
changes in pollution.
29
arguably contribute less to aggregate pollution.44
Table 4. Impact of Monitoring
DiD DiD+IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Outcome - Aerosol Optical Depth
# Mon × Post -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.028***
(0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0055)
Mean of dependent variable 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
Observations 16319 16312 16319 16312
First stage: Dependent variable is # Mon × Post
Min # Mon × Post 0.60*** 0.56***
(0.047) (0.048)
F-stat of excl. instrument 161.5 134.7
Panel B: Outcome - log(# firms receiving any air pollution enforcement)
# Mon × Post 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.045) (0.041) (0.071) (0.065)
Mean of dependent variable 1.79 1.79 1.79 1.79
Observations 1416 1416 1416 1416
First stage: Dependent variable is # Mon × Post
Min # Mon × Post 0.57*** 0.57***
(0.060) (0.060)
F-stat of excl. instrument 90.0 91.9
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes No Yes No
Target-Time FE No Yes No Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of one additional monitor’s effects on both air pollution and city-level
enforcement using our simplified baseline specification. Given the different temporal aggregations of the data,
time controls are at the monthly level in Panel A, and at the yearly level in Panel B. Additional controls
include weather controls: precipitation and average temperature at the respective time level, and mayor
controls: mayor’s age. Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. AOD is formally defined as the negative of the natural
logarithm of the fraction of light that is not scattered or absorbed. Hence, these estimates can be interpreted
as percentage changes in pollution.
44We are able to include the non-ASIF firms in this analysis since we can match them to cities, even if we
don’t know the exact geographic location within the city.
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City Level: Specifications and Sample Definitions
In this section, we explore some additional specification checks to make sure that our esti-
mates from the previous section can be interpreted as the causal effects of the monitoring
program. Table C7 presents these additional results.
Panels A and B of the Table C7 report the results for AOD and log(# firms) respec-
tively. In columns (1) and (3), we drop data from the provinces Xinjiang and Tibet because
the areas covered by cities in these two provinces are much larger than for the rest of the
country. The estimates for AOD using the restricted sample is slightly smaller (2.3–2.5%),
but of a comparable magnitude to our baseline estimates (2.7–3%) and still highly statis-
tically significant. In columns (2) and (4), we add controls for the following baseline city
characteristics interacted with year dummies: city GDP in 2010, whether a city is assigned
a background monitor, and the size of the build-up area. The estimated effects are slightly
larger (2.8–3.5%) when these controls are included, but again of a similar magnitude to
what we find in the baseline model. As shown in Panel B, estimates for log(# firms) are also
very close to the baseline estimates. Taken together this evidence suggests that both the
difference-in-differences and the instrumental variable model that we estimate are robust to
changes in the sample and to the inclusion of additional controls.
City Level: Regression Discontinuity Evidence
While all results from the above implemented empirical strategies and specification checks
suggest that we capture the causal effect of the number of monitors on pollution and en-
forcement, a potential remaining concern is that we are comparing cities of different sizes.
This could be an issue if the incentives to reduce pollution changes differently across cities
of varying sizes after 2015. We do not have any reason to suspect that this is the case.
However, to formally address this potential concern, we conduct an additional analysis in
which we explore the variation caused by discontinuities in the number of monitoring stations
determined by cutoffs set up in the central government’s assignment criteria.
The strategy is essentially a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where the identification
relies on the assumption that all other city characteristics change smoothly at the cutoffs.
Table C1 in Appendix C shows the criteria determining the minimum number of monitors for
each city in our sample. Compared to the standard regression discontinuity design using one
running variable and cutoff, we have two running variables and multiple cutoffs. However, in
practice, we document that population size does not predict the realized number of monitors.
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Hence, we only use the size of the build-up area as the running variable.45 To improve the
statistical power of our regression discontinuity analysis, which suffers from the low number
of cities in our sample, we pool all observations, and make inferences as in a standard
regression discontinuity design with a single cutoff. As documented in Table C1, there are 3
cutoffs in total. Among the 177 cities, only 8 cities have a population larger than 1 million
or a geographical size of the built-up area that is larger than 100 km2. We, therefore, focus
on the first two cutoffs.
We start with a visual inspection of the data following the approach suggested by
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). First, we investigate whether the actual number
of monitors installed differs for cities on opposing sides of the assignment cutoffs. Figure 6a
illustrates the results by showing a binned scatter plot of the number of monitors in each city
on the geographical size of the city’s build-up area, with negative values for cities below the
closest cutoff and positive values for cities above the closest cutoff. Cutoff fixed effects are
absorbed before plotting the data and the graph also reports a fitted second degree polyno-
mial. The number of monitors exhibits a sharp jump when moving from the left to the right
of the threshold. The first-stage estimates show that cities just above the threshold have
installed approximately 1.5 additional monitors. Figure 6b and 6c use the same approach as
above and show the reduced form estimates on AOD and log(# firms) in the post period.
We see clear jumps in both AOD and log(# firms) when moving from the left to the right
of the threshold.
Table 5 quantifies the graphical findings in Figure 6 using the bias corrected local linear
regressions approach suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), controlling for
cutoff fixed effects and average AOD in 2010 (our baseline year). We report estimates for
the optimal bandwidth suggested by the same authors in the table and show robustness
to alternative bandwidths in Figure D5. The first three columns report the RD regression
results using different kernel weighting methods. The last column reports the estimate from
a difference-in-discontinuities regression proposed by Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016),
which also exploits the longitudinal nature of the data. This approach entails an estimation
of the standard nonparametric RD model with every term being interacted with dummy
variables indicating the post period.46 In all specifications, we cluster standard errors on
the city. The evidence shows that cities just above the threshold have substantially lower
satellites-measured AOD than cities just below the threshold, with a slightly smaller size of
the build-up area. The size of these coefficients are of a similar magnitude to those found
45An alternative strategy that uses the shortest distance to any of the two running variables, produces
similar results.
46More details about the difference-in-discontinuities strategy can be found in Appendix B.1.
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Notes: These graphs use the geographical size of the city’s build-up area as the running
variable and pool data for the first two cutoffs. The cutoff fixed effect is absorbed before
plotting the regression discontinuities in Panel 6a and 6d. Baseline (2010) AOD and
log(# firms) are also controlled for in Panel 6b, 6c, 6e, and 6f. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the city level. Error spikes represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
when estimating the difference-in-differences and instrumental variables strategies discussed
above. Cities above the threshold also have significantly higher enforcement levels in the post
period. Although less precise, all regression discontinuity estimates confirm the findings in
the previous analysis.
The above estimation results rest on the standard assumption that there is no manip-
ulation of the running variable and that other characteristics of cities are smooth at the
thresholds. If mayors were able to manipulate the size of the built-up area and sort below
the threshold to avoid an additional monitor, our estimates would still suffer from selection
bias. Figure D6 in Appendix D is reassuring about the absence of manipulation, as there
is no jump in the distribution at any threshold. To test whether municipalities could have
manipulated the running variable, we take advantage of the McCrary (2008) observation
that in the absence of manipulation, the density of the running variable should be contin-
uous around the threshold. To formally test whether the density of the running variable is
continuous at the threshold, we use the local polynomial density estimator and test statistic
as described in Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2018). Figure D6e plots the estimated empirical
density. The graphical representation clearly suggests that the running variable is contin-
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Table 5. Regression Discontinuity Estimates
RD Diff-in-Disc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Outcome - Aerosol Optical Depth
# Monitors -0.024** -0.027* -0.028** -0.025*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 3960 2376 2448 9216
Bandwidth 12.8 8.57 8.91 12.8
First stage 1.50*** 1.61*** 1.79*** 1.50***
(0.26) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26)
Panel B: Outcome - log(# firms receiving any air pollu. enforce.)
# Monitors 0.27** 0.27** 0.26** 0.27**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Observations 258 258 285 688
Bandwidth 10.3 10.7 11.4 10.3
First stage 1.67*** 1.68*** 1.65*** 1.67***
(0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Kernel Uniform Epanechnikov Triangle Uniform
Notes: This table reports results from the regression discontinuity design. The first three columns report
estimates using different kernel weighting methods. The discontinuities at the normalized cutoff are es-
timated using local linear regressions and MSE-optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and
Titiunik (2014) for respective kernel weighting method. RD regressions control for cutoff fixed effects and
baseline (2010) AOD/log(# firms). The last column reports the Diff-in-Disc regression proposed by Grembi,
Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
uous at the threshold. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the density of the running
variable is continuous at the threshold is 0.791.
To test the second assumption, we study the main threat to this identification strategy,
i.e., that cities with a different number of monitors face different pollution reduction targets.
We look at targets for cities close to the thresholds using the same cross-sectional specification
we used above to estimate the first-stage impact on the number of monitors. Figure 6d
reports the results from this exercise and shows that pollution reduction targets are smooth
around the thresholds. This suggests that differential pollution reduction targets do not
drive our results. As additional checks, we present RD plots (Figures 6e and 6f) of AOD
and log(# firms) for the pre-policy periods (2012-2014). Contrary to the post-policy periods
(2015-2017), we see no jumps at the threshold of the normalized running variable. If there
is any jump in other characteristics of cities at the thresholds, the violation of the second
assumption would likely be reflected in these two figures.
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The regression discontinuity estimates corroborate the results from our baseline specifi-
cation discussed above, indicating that the introduction of the air quality monitors affected
local enforcement and pollution. While the regression discontinuity approach has the key
advantage of requiring weaker assumptions for causal inference, the power of this analysis
is lower and it rests on a limited sample close to the threshold. We, therefore, focus on the
panel specifications in the following section, where we explore potential mechanisms.
5 Mechanisms
In this section, we investigate the potential channels through which the information captured
by the monitors strengthens enforcement and reduces pollution. In sections 5.1 and 5.2, we
explore whether monitors improve top-down and/or bottom-up accountability. Thereafter,
we explore how a change in the information provision process that separates the responsibility
to provide information from the responsibility to enforce regulations affects our results.
5.1 Top-Down Accountability: Performance Incentives
As discussed in Section 2.1, pollution reduction is one of the criteria that local leaders are
evaluated on and their performance determines their probability of promotion. Hence, a
natural interpretation of our main findings is that monitors improve the central govern-
ment’s ability to evaluate how well local officials perform. In this section, we investigate this
proposed mechanism more directly by exploiting heterogeneity in the promotion incentives
faced by local officials. To get a plausibly exogenous measure of local promotion incentives,
we use two unique features of the Chinese political system. First, we use the timing of
the National People’s Congress (NPC), which is held every five years and determines when
political promotions are made in China. As documented in Xi, Yao, and Zhang (2018), the
average probability of promotion for a city official in the last year of a political cycle (when
the NPC is held) is nearly three times that of the first year in a cycle. We then combine this
information with two official requirements for mayors of prefecture-level cities: that they
retire at age 60 and serve for at least three years in a post. This means that city officials
above the age of 57 at the time of the NPC face a discontinuously lower probability of being
promoted and, therefore, weaker performance incentives (as documented in Xi, Yao, and
Zhang, 2018).
To conduct this analysis, we collect data on all mayors in office during our sample period
and calculate their age at the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC), which was held in
March 2018. If the information provided by the monitors strengthens the ability of the
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central government to hold local officials accountable, we would expect smaller effects of
monitoring for cities with mayors that will be above 57 years of age at the time of the
congress. Mayors who are not facing promotion incentives are arguably less likely to work
to achieve stricter enforcement of regulations.
To test our hypothesis about promotion incentives formally, we employ the simplified
difference-in-differences version of Equation 2 and add an interaction term between the
number of monitors in a city and the age of the mayor at the time of the congress. As may-
ors’ work experience might confound our analysis, we use a similar idea to the RD design
and plot the differential effects (i.e., the interaction terms) of an additional monitor on both
pollution and enforcement by the age of the mayor at the time of the congress in Figure 7.
We normalize the effect to 0 for cities with a mayor who would be 58 years old. A distinctive
feature of both graphs is that the average effects are not distinguishable from 0 if the mayor
is older than 58. At age 57, we see a substantial jump of the estimates in both graphs.
The fact that estimates jump at 57 and are then consistent, suggests that our results are
indeed driven by performance incentives and not by work experience or other age-related
characteristics (for which we would not expect a jump at age 57). We conclude from this
analysis that a pre-existing incentive scheme similar to those that are typically proposed to
address the principal–agent problem is key in order for monitoring to have an impact on
enforcement and air pollution.























































(b) Age vs Increases in Enforcement
Notes: Figure 7 displays the effects of an additional monitor on both enforcement
and pollution by mayors’ age in 2018. The effect is normalized to 0 for cities with a
mayor who would be 58 years old in 2018. Figure 7a is the effect on the increase of
enforcement. Figure 7b is the effect on the pollution reduction.
We report the regression results of a simplified version of the results presented in Figure 7
in Table C8 in Appendix C, where we instead interact the number of monitors with whether a
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mayor is above or below the age cutoff at the time of the NPC. Panel A displays the results
for air pollution, and Panel B displays the results on enforcement. In the first column,
we use the full sample from our main analysis in Section 4.2 and we then subsequently
restrict the sample to mayors closer to the performance age cutoff (again following the
regression discontinuity logic). The coefficients for the number of monitors are very similar
to those obtained in our main analysis. The interaction terms have the opposite sign and
are substantial – suggesting that effects are reduced by between 50–100% for mayors that
are not facing performance incentives.
5.2 Bottom-Up Accountability: Citizen Information Acquisition
An alternative explanation for our main results, is that monitors strengthen bottom-up ac-
countability. We believe this is possible in this setting because monitors could inform the
population about local pollution levels, noting that awareness of the health impact of PM2.5
has increased since 2010 (Barwick et al., 2020). A growing literature (Chen, Pan, and Xu,
2016; Meng, Pan, and Yang, 2017) has further found that authoritarian regimes can be re-
sponsive to societal actors.47 Anecdotal evidence further suggests that local governments
could respond to threats of collective action, which are often seen in environment-related
issues.48 Such engagement could potentially further drive up efforts to protect the environ-
ment after the air pollution information is released. To formally test this hypothesis, we
estimate the simplified version of Equation 2 to identify the causal effects of monitoring
on online search behavior. Table 6 shows the estimates for five pollution-related keywords.
Columns (1) and (2) show that searches on air pollution increase by around 3% in cities
that installed one additional monitoring station.49 However, no other estimates are signifi-
cantly different from 0. We believe these effects are likely too small to explain the decrease
in air pollution that we document in the previous section – especially considering that real
action or engagement would probably be lower than the increase in information acquisition
indicated by online searches.
47Chen, Pan, and Xu (2016), for example, document that approximately one third of local county govern-
ments in China respond to citizen demands expressed online.
48Seehttps://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2015/06/150624_shanghai_chemicalplant for ex-
ample.
49Barwick et al. (2020) find larger effects on citizen awareness and behavior when studying the introduction
of monitors (extensive margin) in provincial capitals in 2013. The difference in results is explained by the
fact that our analysis compares citizens in cities with different numbers of monitors – as opposed to with
and without monitors – and focus on a sample of smaller cities.
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Table 6. Impact of Monitoring on Online Searches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: log(key word)
Key words: air pollution haze/smog PM2.5 air mask air purifier
# Mon × Post 0.027*** 0.042* -0.0012 0.025 0.0020
(0.0069) (0.025) (0.0015) (0.016) (0.030)
Mean of dependent variable -0.60 -0.18 -0.68 -0.46 -0.021
Observations 14603 14603 14603 14603 14603
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of one additional monitor’s effects on online search behavior. Each
column is from a separate regression estimating the impact on a specific keyword. Additional controls
include weather controls: precipitation and average temperature at respective time level; and mayor controls:
mayor’s age. Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
5.3 Changing Information Provision
Although providing incentives for performance is a common approach to deal with the
principal–agent problem, it has long been recognized that high-powered incentives can also
distort the type of effort exerted or even encourage various harmful activities focused on
improving indicators of performance (Figlio and Winicki, 2005; Banerjee, Duflo, and Glen-
nerster, 2008; Fisman and Wang, 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2020). Manipulating data on which
performance is evaluated is one strategy that has been documented in a series of studies
(Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Figlio and Getzler, 2006; Banerjee, Duflo, and Glennerster, 2008;
Sandefur and Glassman, 2015; Greenstone et al., 2019). In this section, we study whether the
structure of the information provision system could mitigate such concerns. In particular,
our interest lies in understanding whether a separation of the agent responsible for provid-
ing information from the agent responsible for enforcing regulations affects the quality of
information and whether such quality improvements can, in turn, strengthen accountability
and government performance (i.e. change behavior of the enforcement agent).
Several media sources have reported on manipulation of the pollution data from the
monitors by local government officials.50 Such manipulation took many different forms –
ranging from directly adjusting the numbers to spraying the monitors with water, as shown
in Figure D10 in Appendix D. Following this reporting, the central government decided to
50See https://p.dw.com/p/32jqR and http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-08/09/c_
1123244676.htm for example.
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reassign the control of monitors to external parties, as documented above. In this section, we
take advantage of this reassignment policy to see whether increasing the cost of manipulation
for the local government is an effective way to improve monitoring, reduce manipulation, and
through that, to enforce environmental policy.
As discussed in Section 2, all monitors in our sample were reassigned to third parties at
the same time in 2016.51 Hence, we are not able to exploit any policy variation to estimate
the causal effect of the information provider. Instead, we focus on a descriptive analysis
and discuss potential implications. First, we study how the AOD elasticity of PM2.5 changes
when the way information is provided changes (It).52 More specifically, we estimate:
log(PM2.5)mt = δm + γt + β1AODmt + β2AODmt × It + ϵmt, (3)
where log(PM2.5)mt is the logarithm of monthly average concentrations of PM2.5 reported
from monitor m at time t, δm and γt represent fixed effects for monitors and time. The
variable AODmt captures the average monthly AOD for pixels covering monitor m.53 It is a
dummy variable indicating whether the data is reported after the reassignment. Therefore,
the main coefficient of interest is β2. If information is more accurate when monitors are
controlled by the third party, we would expect that AOD and PM2.5 measures are more
aligned after the reassignment and therefore that β2 > 0. Note that this coefficient captures
how the alignment between AOD and PM2.5 changes over time, while still allowing for
pollution levels to change over time.
The results from estimating Equation 3 are reported in Table 7. As a point of reference,
we start by estimating the elasticity for all monitors without any interaction term (this
replicates the results in the first column of Table C3). We then restrict our analysis to
the main monitors used in our study and find a positive estimate for the interaction term.
This shows that the elasticity is 0.12 larger after the third party takes over the monitoring
stations (corresponding to a 40% increase compared to the pre-period when local governments
control the monitors). This evidence is consistent with less manipulation and higher quality
information during the period when the information provision responsibility is separated
from the enforcement responsibility.
One alternative explanation for the above results is that the AOD data is better able to
51Note that there were in total only 6 companies responsible for taking over the operation of the monitors.
52We focus on PM2.5 because this is the pollutant most strongly correlated with AOD (see Table C3) and
because it is the primary indicator that officials are facing incentives to reduce (see Table C2). Martinez
(2018) studies the manipulation of GDP data by autocratic leaders using a similar specification.
53To deal with the fact that data is sometimes missing for the pixel just above the monitor, due to cloud
coverage, the value for missing pixels is interpolated from surrounding cells. All results are robust to using
data at the city level instead.
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capture changes in pollution after the reassignment (this could, e.g., be due to changes in
the composition of pollution over time or changes to the satellite instruments). To make sure
that the changes we observe are due to improved monitor data rather than satellite data, we
conduct a placebo analysis using the background monitors discussed above.54 The readings
from these monitors are not used by the central government to evaluate the performance
of the local government. Hence, there are weaker incentives for officials to manipulate this
information. Columns (4) and (5) report the results. We notice that the overall elasticity
between air pollution measures reported from monitors and satellites is larger for this sam-
ple. When looking at the reassignment, we find that the elasticity change is about half in
magnitude and not statistically distinguishable from zero. Taken together this evidence is
consistent with less manipulation of the background monitors from the start and no change
after the reassignment. This supports our conclusion above that the change in elasticity that
we observe for the main sample is driven by changes in the data reported from the monitors.
However, we are careful about not to draw too strong conclusions from these patterns since
the estimates for the background monitors are imprecisely estimated and not statistically
different from those for the main monitors.
Table 7. Monitor Reassignment, Data Quality and Policy Impact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample: Full Main Background
Outcome: log(PM2.5) log(# firms) AOD
AOD 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.42*** 0.40***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.040) (0.054) (0.068)
AOD × Reassigned 0.12** 0.062
(0.053) (0.13)
# Mon × Post 0.11*** -0.023***
(0.041) (0.0040)
# Mon × Post × Reassigned 0.039** -0.010***
(0.019) (0.0026)
Monitor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
City FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Target-Time FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 19185 16987 16987 2198 2198 1416 16319
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.67 0.63
Notes: This table reports the AOD elasticity of PM2.5. Each column is from a separate regression. Columns
(1)–(5) control for average temperature, rainfall, mayor’s age, and fixed effects specific to monitor and time
(month by year). Columns (6) and (7) control for average temperature, rainfall, mayor’s age, fixed effects
specific to city, and target group by time (6: month by year; 7: year) fixed effect. Robust standard errors
clustered on the city in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
54They are usually installed in a local scenic area that is outside the build-up area.
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The next exercise we carry out is to check whether local governments exert more effort
to decrease pollution after monitors have been reassigned (i.e., when manipulation is more
difficult and they thus have less opportunity to decrease recordings through this method).
The results are reported in columns (6) and (7) of the Table 7 and show that effects are indeed
stronger after monitors have been reassigned. Column (6) shows a 3.9% greater increase in
enforcement and column (7) a 1% larger reduction in pollution per monitor installed after
the retraction. These pieces of evidence are consistent with local governments switching
from data manipulation towards exerting more effort to enforce environmental regulations.
Again, we emphasize that these results must be interpreted with caution because we are only
exploiting temporal variation and thus need to assume that there are no other simultaneous
changes causing these results. An alternative interpretation is that these results capture a
lagged impact of the introduction of the monitors. However, we see no apparent reasons
for why that would affect the relationship between satellite and ground-based measures of
pollution discussed above.
6 Concluding Remarks
This study uses the introduction of a nationwide program in China to investigate the im-
pact of pollution monitoring on local government enforcement of environmental regulations.
Exploiting geo-referenced firm data matched with enforcement records, we find that enforce-
ment is stepped up against firms located within 10 km of a monitor. We also document
that monitoring increases enforcement efficiency by altering which firms are targeted by lo-
cal governments and by strengthening the responsiveness of enforcement to local pollution
levels.
To study the aggregate response to the policy, we conduct a city-level analysis and com-
pare enforcement and pollution levels in cities assigned different numbers of monitors. This
analysis shows that one additional monitor leads to about a 20% increase in the number
of firms that face regulatory enforcement and a subsequent 3% reduction in city-level pol-
lution. Given that the policy assigned a median of 3 monitors per city, this corresponds
to a substantial reduction in overall pollution. Our estimates suggest a 0.41–0.64 µg/m3
reduction in average PM2.5 per additional monitor.55 Previous literature suggests that such
a decrease in pollution could have significant implications for both health and economic out-
55We arrive at the estimate of 0.41 (0.64) µg/m3, the lower (upper) bound, as follows. We multiply 2.8%
(3.0%) from Table 4 by 0.33 (0.41 – the elasticity with truthful reporting) from Table 7 to obtain percentage
changes in PM2.5 per additional monitor. We then multiply by 44.8 (52), the average PM2.5 in our sample
(average PM2.5 in 2015, the first year for which we have PM2.5 data), to estimate the implied unit change
in PM2.5.
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comes. For example, Ebenstein et al. (2017) find that a 10 µg/m3 increase in PM10 reduces
life expectancy by 0.64 years in China. The medical costs of heavy air pollution are also
substantial – Barwick, Li, Lin, and Zou (2020), for example, document that a permanent
decrease of 10 µg/m3 in China leads to annual savings of more than 10 billion dollars in
health spending. Another cost of heavy air pollution in developing countries is the loss of
productivity – Chang et al. (2016); He, Liu, and Salvo (2019) find that a 10 µg/m3 increase
in PM2.5 leads to about 0.5 to 6% drop in productivity and labor cost saving. Combining
the evidence from the above literature, the cost savings generated by the reduction in air
pollution caused by the monitoring program would likely exceed the related costs in the
short run.56
An examination of possible mechanisms suggests that the monitoring program is effective
because it enables the central government to hold local government accountable for their
actions. We support this claim by showing that monitoring is effective in localities where local
officials face performance incentives, but is largely ineffective in cities where such incentives
are not in place. On the contrary, we find little evidence that monitors strengthen bottom-
up accountability. Finally, we document suggestive evidence showing that monitors deliver
more reliable information when local governments are not involved in information reporting
and are solely responsible for enforcement. When such an information provision structure is
in place, the effect of an additional monitor both enforcement of regulations and the level of
pollution is about 40% larger.
We believe our findings not only show that pollution monitoring could be an effective
policy tool to combat ambient air pollution, but it also offers some general lessons on how
to approach the problem of lacking enforcement of government regulations caused by the
principal–agent problem. Our findings suggest that reliable real-time monitoring of policy
outcomes at the local level could contribute to closing the enforcement gap as long as local
officials face performance incentives. However, the existence of such performance incentives
could at the same time distort the behavior of local officials towards data manipulation.
Therefore, the information provision system would need to be carefully designed to ensure
accurate top-down accountability – e.g., by ensuring that information provision and enforce-
ment responsibilities are sufficiently separated.
56There are two main costs to consider when installing a monitor: the cost of the equipment and operation
costs. According to the government procurement website, the cost of equipment per monitor ranges from $
200,000 to $ 400,000, while yearly operation costs are about $ 20,000.
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Appendix A Data Details
A.1 Enforcement Data Processing
The analysis in this paper relies on new geo-coded data on the enforcement actions carried
out by local officials. This data is constructed in two steps. First, information from all
enforcement records in a city is extracted and categorised. Second, these records are matched
to the annual survey of industrial firms, which we have geo-referenced. The following two
sections describe the procedure in detail.
Encoding of Records
We rely on enforcement records collected by The Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs.
Figure A1 provides an example of what these records look like and the type of information
they contain. In the record, we can identify which regulation the firm has violated and
the local government’s response to that violation. For each record, we extract whether the
violation refers to air pollution, water pollution, solid-waste pollution, or procedural issues57;
and the punishment imposed by the local government. Our algorithm follows this step-wise
procedure:
1. We first check whether the record contains multiple firms:
• if the record only contains one firm, we extract the whole record;
• if the record contains multiple firms, we extract only the relevant block.
2. Once the relevant information has been extracted, our categorization by type first
distinguishes between enforcement related to air pollution and three other type of
violations: water, solid waste, and procedure. The categorization is done by identifying
the keywords listed below:58
• keywords for air pollution: NO, PM, SO2, 气, 烟, 尘, 脱硝, 脱硫, 炉;
• keywords for water pollution: COD, 污水, 水污染, 沉淀, 沟, 渠;
• keyword for solid waste pollution: 固体;
• keywords for procedural violation: 未批先建, 批建不符, 未验先投
3. For records related to air pollution, we separately identify the following punishment
types: suspension, equipment replacement/upgrading, fine, and warning. The catego-
rization is done by identifying the keywords listed below:
57The violation of a procedure usually refers to installation or production before receiving the required
license.
58Note that one record could contain several different violations.
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• keywords for suspension: 停;
• keywords for upgrading: 改, 维修;
• keywords for fine: 罚款, 经济处罚, 万元;
• keywords for warning: 监测情况, 超标
For the vast majority of records, we use a python algorithm to extract the above information.
However, about 1500 records are stored as pictures. For these we have manually extracted
the information.
Geo-coding Firm Location
We collect information on all active manufacturing firms using the Annual Survey of In-
dustrial Firms in 2013, the most recent wave. The ASIF data includes private industrial
enterprises with annual sales exceeding 5 million RMB and all the state-owned industrial
enterprises (SOEs). The data is collected and maintained by the National Bureau of Statis-
tics and contains a rich set of information obtained from these firms’ accounting books,
such as inputs, outputs, sales, taxes, and profits. Essential for our analysis, the data also
includes information about the address of the firm. However, this address information is
not always detailed enough to identify an exact geographic location. If this is the case, we
rely on two additional sources to complement the ASIF data. First, we follow the recent
literature (Beraja, Yang, and Yuchtman, 2020) and use the Tianyancha firm registration
database to identify the precise coordinates. If the precise coordinates are not available in
the Tianyancha database, we use the Google Maps API to identify the coordinates by using
the firm’s full name. We then cross-reference the information generated by Google Maps to
ensure that it corresponds to the general location provided in the Tianyancha database. For
around 4,000 firms, we are unable to pinpoint the exact geographic location using the above
approach. For these firms, we manually collect the address information from other internet
sources. In the end, we have the precise geographic information for 98.7% of firms.
A.2 Representativeness of Main Analysis Sample
Our sample contains the 177 cities that installed new monitors in 2015. This focus is moti-
vated by three main reasons. First, we do not want to mix cities that had monitors in the
past with those that got a monitor for the first time. The key reason for this is that the new
information gained from an updated monitor is different since it captures recordings on a
much wider set of pollutants. Second, cities with old monitors are dramatically different from
cities with new monitors. In Table A1 in the appendix we compare the descriptive statistics
of cities with new monitors to those that had air quality monitors before the reform. We
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see that the urban population and the size of the built-up area in cities with old monitors
are 5-6 times larger. The size of the economy is also substantially different, as captured by
the lights at night data. Finally, we exclude cities that received monitors at an earlier stage
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due to targeting related to environmental policies as discussed in Section 2.2. This leaves us
with our final sample in column (3) of Table A1.
Table A1. Summary Statistics
Old Cities Targeted Cites Our Sample
Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) 0.45 0.48 0.34
(0.24) (0.25) (0.23)
Number of Monitors 6.26 3.69 3.12
(2.75) (0.79) (1.26)
Urban Population (10,000) 195.1 59.9 33.8
(303.7) (34.6) (21.0)
Size of the Build-up Area (km2) 257.7 108.4 46.8
(345.1) (140.2) (27.2)
New City 0 1 1
Number of observations 10848 4608 16319
Notes: Author’s tabulations.
A.3 Additional Data
Local Leader Characteristics Information on local officials is collected from the database
compiled by Jiang (2018). The database contains extensive demographic and career in-
formation for over 4,000 key city, provincial and national leaders in China from the late
1990s until 2015. For each leader, the database provides standardized information about the
time, place, organization, and rank of every job assignment listed in their curriculum vitae.
The data is collected from government websites, yearbooks, and other trustworthy Internet
sources. We use the database to calculate the age of city mayors in our sample, which can
be used to infer the promotion incentives faced by the mayor, as discussed above. Since our
analysis stretches beyond 2015, we expand the database and collect information about the
characteristics of mayors up until 2018.
Baidu Search Index To study the impact of new air pollution information, we collect data
about local awareness of air pollution information from the Baidu Search Index. Similar to
Google Trends (GT), Baidu Search Index provides a measurement of the search volume of a
keyword in a given period from both computers and mobile devices. The Index is constructed
by summing the weighted frequencies of all search queries for a specific keyword by city and
by day. However, the exact algorithm of the Baidu Index is confidential and unknown to the
public. Previous studies (Qin and Zhu, 2018; Barwick et al., 2020) argue that the correlation
between the Index and actual online search volume is linear. To match the frequency of our
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analysis on the air pollution data, we collect the monthly search volume from the Baidu
Search Index of each city for the following keywords (in Chinese): air pollution, haze/smog,
PM2.5, air mask, and air purifier.59
Weather Variables To control for local weather conditions, which are important deter-
minants of the concentration of air pollution in prior work, we collect temperature and
precipitation data from the China Meteorological Administration. The data combines ob-
servations from 496 weather stations across China and uses the ANUSPLIN meteorological
interpolation model to generate a monthly dataset with a geographic resolution of 0.5× 0.5.
We match this data to our prefecture-level cities to get a local measure of weather conditions.
59The Chinese translation of these five keywords are 空气污染, 雾霾, PM2.5, 口罩, 空气净化器.
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Appendix B Additional Analysis
B.1 Difference-in-Discontinuities
We also exploit the longitudinal nature of our data using a “difference-in-discontinuities”
(or Diff-in-Disc) design (Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano, 2016).60 This design essentially
combines a difference-in-differences (comparing the air pollution in cities with a different
number of monitors, before and after 2015) with a regression discontinuity design (comparing
the air pollution of cities just above or below certain cutoffs). To estimate the Diff-in-Disc
model, we follow the common practice of using local linear regression. More specifically, we
estimate the following equation:
yit = δ0 + δ1Di + Si(γ0 + γ1Di) + Tt[α0 + α1Di + Si(β0 + β1Di)] + ξit, (4)
where Si is a dummy for cities above cutoffs, Tt an indicator for the period after 2015,
and Di the normalized running variable. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
Treatment is captured by Tt × Si and the coefficient of interest is therefore β0. This is the
Diff-in-Disc estimate and identifies the reduced-form effect of being just above the cutoff.
We normalize the estimates to the treatment effect of one additional monitor by dividing
β0 by the first-stage RD estimates. We check the robustness of our results using different
bandwidths. Results of the Diff-in-Disc regressions are shown in Column (4) of the Table 5.
60Several studies in the literature have exploited the longitudinal nature of the data in an RD framework,
such as the fixed-effect RD estimator in Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), the first-difference RD estimator in
Lemieux and Milligan (2008), or the dynamic RD design in Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010).
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Appendix C Additional Tables
Table C1. Monitor Assignment Criteria
Population (10,000) Size of Build-Up Area (sq. km) Min # Monitors # Cities
< 25 < 20 1 26
25− 50 20− 50 2 82
50− 100 50− 100 4 61
100− 200 100− 200 6 8
Sources: Technical regulation (2013) for selection of ambient air quality monitoring stations
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, see www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/fgbz/bz/bzwb/jcffbz/
201309/t20130925_260810.htm)
Table C2. Targets by Province
Targeted Pollutants Target Provinces
PM2.5 -25% Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei
PM2.5 -20% Shagxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang
PM2.5 -15% Guangdong, Chongqing
PM2.5 -10% Inner mongolia
PM10 -15% Henan, Shannxi, Qinghai, Xinjiang
PM10 -12% Gnasu, Hubei
PM10 -10% Sichuan, Liangning, Jilin, Hunan, Anhui, Ningxia
PM10 -5% Guangxi, Fujian, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang
PM10 Keep improving Hainan, Tibet, Yunnan
Notes: This table reports the pollution reduction targets stipulated by the central government for each
province. The reduction targets correspond to the percentage reduction that should be achieved by the end
of 2017 compared to 2012.
Source: The Ministry of Environmental Protection
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Table C3. Validating Satellite Data
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome: log(PM2.5) log(PM10) log(AQI)
AOD 0.33*** 0.28*** 0.23***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.015)
Monitor FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19185 19185 19185
R-squared 0.78 0.79 0.80
Notes: This table reports the relationship between AOD and three monitor-based measures of air pollution:
PM2.5, PM10, and the combined AQI. Each column is from a separate regression. All regressions control for
average temperature, rainfall, mayor’s age, and fixed effects specific to monitor and time (month by year).
Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively.
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Table C4. Industry Composition
Name of the Industry Code (two digits) Freq. Pct.
Mining and Washing of Coal 6 1588 4.40
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 7 38 0.11
Mining and Processing of Ferrous Metal Ores 8 568 1.57
Mining and Processing of Non-Ferrous Metal Ores 9 244 0.68
Mining and Processing of Nonmetallic Mineral 10 560 1.55
Mining Support 11 23 0.06
Other Mining 12 4 0.01
Agricultural and Sideline Food Processing 13 3872 10.72
Fermentation 14 1241 3.44
Beverage Manufacturing 15 994 2.75
Tobacco Manufacturing 16 25 0.07
Textile Mills 17 1457 4.04
Wearing Apparel and Clothing Accessories Manufacturing 18 856 2.37
Leather, Fur and Related Products Manufacturing 19 654 1.81
Wood and Bamboo Products Manufacturing 20 994 2.75
Furniture Manufacturing 21 365 1.01
Products Manufacturing 22 768 2.13
Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media 23 437 1.21
Education and Entertainment Articles Manufacturing 24 603 1.67
Petrochemicals Manufacturing 25 168 0.47
Chemical Products Manufacturing 26 2625 7.27
Medicine Manufacturing 27 999 2.77
Chemical Fibers Manufacturing 28 42 0.12
Rubber Products Manufacturing 29 1404 3.89
Plastic Products Manufacturing 30 3977 11.01
Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing 31 1449 4.01
Iron and Steel Smelting 32 450 1.25
Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting 33 1226 3.40
Fabricated Metal Products Manufacturing 34 1543 4.27
General Purpose Machinery Manufacturing 35 1537 4.26
Special Purpose Machinery Manufacturing 36 1268 3.51
Transport Equipment Manufacturing 37 238 0.66
Electrical machinery and equipment Manufacturing 38 1437 4.00
Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 39 553 1.53
Computers and Electronic Products Manufacturing 40 218 0.60
General Instruments and Other Equipment Manufacturing 41 134 0.37
Craft-works Manufacturing 42 118 0.33
Renewable Materials Recovery 43 26 0.07
Electricity and Heat Supply 44 1003 2.78
Gas Production and Supply 45 178 0.49
Water Production and Supply 46 222 0.61
Total 36106 100.00
Notes: Industrial classification for national economic activities (GB/T 4754—2002). The sample is from
the 2013 Annual Survey of Industrial Firms and includes firms that were set up before 2010 and located
within 50 km from an air quality monitor.
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Table C5. Firm-Level Enforcement: Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Enforcement Action
Outcome Air Water Solid Waste Procedure
Mon<10km × Post 0.0078*** 0.0020 0.00050 0.0016
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.00085) (0.0016)
Mean of dependent variable 0.013 0.0091 0.0031 0.0075
Observations 288696 288696 288696 288696
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of air pollution monitoring on the probability of being subject to
different types of environmental enforcement. Each column reports the estimate from the simplified version
of Equation (1). All regressions control for fixed effects specific to firm, industry-by-year interactions, and
province-by-year interactions. Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Table C6. City-Level Enforcement: Gradient and All Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Outcome -log(# firms receiving any air pollution enforcement)
Sample ASIF 0-10km 10-20km 20-30km 30-40km 40-km
# Mon × Post 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.078*** 0.033 0.046* 0.035
(0.040) (0.035) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Mean of dependent variable 1.11 0.50 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.16
Observations 1416 1416 1416 1416 1416 1416
Panel B: Outcome - log(# firms receiving any air pollution enforcement)
Sample All Firms ASIF Firms Non-ASIF Firms
# Mon × Post 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.099* 0.11
(0.045) (0.072) (0.040) (0.065) (0.054) (0.090)
Mean of dependent variable 1.79 1.79 1.11 1.11 1.40 1.40
F-stat excl. instrument 91.9 91.9 91.9
Observations 1416 1416 1416 1416 1416 1416
Method DiD DiD+IV DiD DiD+IV DiD DiD+IV
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the effect of one additional monitor on city level enforcement. Each column
reports the estimate from the simplified version of Equation (2). Additional controls include weather controls:
precipitation and average temperature at respective time level; and mayor’s age. Robust standard errors
clustered on the city in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table C7. Robustness: Sample Restriction and Additional Controls
DiD DiD+IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Outcome - Aerosol Optical Depth
# Mon × Post -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.035*
(0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0056) (0.019)
Mean of dependent variable 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Observations 14625 15931 14625 15931
First stage: Dependent variable is # Mon × Post
Min # Mon × Post 0.55*** 0.42***
(0.051) (0.12)
F-stat of excl. instrument 115.7 12.3
Panel B: Outcome - log(# firms receiving any air pollution enforcement)
# Mon × Post 0.11** 0.14*** 0.16** 0.17***
(0.044) (0.042) (0.070) (0.062)
Mean of dependent variable 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18
Observations 1263 1415 1263 1415
First stage: Dependent variable is # Mon × Post
Min # Mon × Post 0.55*** 0.61***
(0.061) (0.053)
F-stat of excl. instrument 82.2 131.1
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Restricted sample Yes No Yes No
Baseline characteristics by year No Yes No Yes
Notes: This table reports the effect of one additional monitor on both air pollution and city level enforce-
ment. Each column reports the estimate from the simplified version of Equation (2). Additional controls
include weather controls: precipitation and average temperature at the respective time level, and mayor
controls: mayor’s age. In column (1) and (3), we drop data from the provinces Xinjiang and Tibet since the
area covered by cities in these two provinces are much larger than for the rest of the country. In column
(2) and (4), we add controls for the following baseline city characteristics interacted with year dummies:
city GDP in 2010, whether a city is assigned a background monitor, and the size of build-up area. Robust
standard errors clustered on the city in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
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Table C8. Promotion Incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age bandwidth: Full ±10 Years ±7 Years ±5 Years
Panel A: Outcome - Aerosol Optical Depth
# Mon × Post -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.022***
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0044)
# Mon × Post × Above 57 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.021***
(0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0030)
Mean of dependent variable 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.32
Observations 16319 15208 14000 11084
Panel B: Outcome - log(# firms receiving any air pollution enforcement)
# Mon × Post 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.052)
# Mon × Post × Above 57 -0.098** -0.10** -0.10** -0.12**
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Mean of dependent variable 1.18 1.15 1.24 1.23
Observations 1416 1360 1248 1008
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports heterogeneous effects of monitoring on air pollution (Panel A) and environmen-
tal enforcement (Panel B). Each column reports the estimate from the simplified version of Equation (2).
Additional controls include weather controls: precipitation and average temperature at the respective time
level. Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
61
Appendix D Additional Figures
Figure D1. Geographical Distribution of Data











(b) Distribution of AOD in 2010
(c) Location of Firms (d) Location of Enforcement Activities
Notes: This figure shows the geographical distribution of the data used for analysis
in this study. Panel A shows the location of pollution monitors (black triangles). To
facilitate the reading of the map, overlapping monitors have been displaced, and the
centroid of the overlapping monitors is displayed with a red circle. Panel B shows the
average AOD for each prefecture-level city in 2010. Panel C shows the exact geographic
location of manufacturing firms in the 2013 Annual Survey of Industrial Firms, and








Figure D2. Monitors and Enforcement Activities in Central China
Notes: This figure shows the spatial relationship between monitors, manufacturing firms and enforcement activities for cities in central
China. Enforcement activities are reported both for the period before monitors were installed (2010-2014) as well as for the period after
installation (2015-2017). Red and blue bubbles mark clusters of enforcement. The size of the bubble corresponds to the number of firms
that were issued at least one enforcement activity and the location of the bubble corresponding to the centroid of all enforcement activities
occurring within 50 km. Two things emerge from this map. First, the number of enforcement activities clearly increases after 2015. Second,
these enforcement activities tend to be located closer to where monitors are placed.
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(b) Firm Centroid
Notes: The figures show the relative increase in enforcement after the introduction of
monitors in 2015 for each distance bin to either the Environmental Bureau (Panel a) or
the city’s firm centroid (Panel b). Estimates are produced using the same specification
as for Figure 2b in the paper. Error spikes represent 95 percent confidence intervals
based on standard errors clustered on the city.
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Year
(b) DiD+IV
Notes: The figures present the estimates from Equation 2 of city-level enforcement
(log(# firms)) using two different specifications (DiD, DiD+IV). Error spikes represent
95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered on the city.
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(c) RD in log(# firms)
Notes: Vertical axis: RD coefficients. Horizontal axis: bandwidth used to estimate the
reported RD coefficients. The blue dashed line marks the optimal bandwidth (12.8) for
the pollution sample using the approach suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik
(2014). The green dashed line marks the optimal bandwidth (9.5) for the enforcement
sample using the same approach.
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(f) Estimated Density
Notes: The figures provide histograms and estimated densities of the urban population
and the size of the built-up area for our sample over the two cutoffs we use in the
analysis. The size of the built-up area and the urban population have been normalized.
The p-value for the null hypothesis that the density of the normalized size of the build-
up area is continuous at the threshold is 0.791. The p-value for the null hypothesis
that the density of the normalized urban population is continuous at the threshold is
0.312.
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the distance between ASIF firms and the
closest monitor. The sample is restricted to firms that are located within 50 km from
a monitor.
Figure D8. Air-Quality Monitor




Figure D9. Media Reporting on Enforcement Around Monitors
(a) Search Results in Chinese (b) Translation
Notes: This figure includes a screenshot and the corresponding translation of a list of
news articles generated from a search on the Chinese search engine Baidu using the key-
words “monitors”, “surrounding area”, and “check”. The list includes a large number
of articles discussing how local governments organise their environmental inspections
around the monitors. Some examples include cities that draw special zones around
their air quality monitors and send teams of inspectors to those zones, whose task it
is to ensure that firms comply with national environmental regulations. Other sources
mention that city governments hire volunteers from the public to inspect venues (such
as restaurants) within a certain distance from the monitors. Finally, several sources
suggest that mayors take a special interest in these inspections by, e.g., directly ap-
pointing officials to this task or by visit surrounding areas.
Sources: http://www.baidu.com
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Figure D10. Manipulation of Pollution Recordings
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